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As our adversaries continue to evolve in complexity, the U.S. Marines adapt in kind with 
its design and intent through its Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21) Capstone. EF 21 stresses 
the need for increased persistent intelligence collections capabilities and the optimization 
of existing assets. Current requirements for Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) limit 
usage in non-permissive environments beyond the Area of Operations, contrary to the 
new demands of EF 21.  
UGS shortfalls include the technologies in use and the capability of the Marines 
employing them. The fusion of reconnaissance Marines with commercial state-of-the-art 
UGS expands the current ground intelligence collections capability to be rapid and 
adaptable for EF 21. This concept required researching the reconnaissance and 
intelligence battalions, the UGS associated individual standards, and existing UGS from 
McQ Incorporated and the Defense Advance Research Products Agency. Analysis of this 
research consisted of a Systems Engineering approach applied the Doctrine, 
Organizations, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities fields for UGS.   
The result was a new table of organization for the Marines ground sensor 
platoons, focusing on restructuring these units for operational flexibility, fusion with 
reconnaissance Marines to extend tactical reach, and technological upgrades to advance 
all existing UGS capabilities.   
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The current ground reconnaissance capability of the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) far exceeds past generations due to the technological advancements, 
organizational structure of the units, and regimented training [1]. With a diverse set of 
radios for tactical voice and data communications, day and night long range optics, 
precision weapons systems, and state-of-the-art commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
photography equipment, today’s Marine Reconnaissance community incorporates the 
technology to effectively command and control, maneuver, and collect intelligence in 
support of any type of operation [1]. Ground reconnaissance Marines continue to 
organize, train, and deploy for some of the most difficult missions tasked to the 
Department of Defense (DOD), making them prepared, versatile, and eager to test their 
mettle against America’s greatest foes [1]. However, the recent use of ground 
reconnaissance forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) resulted in more overt and direct offensive operations as 
opposed to clandestine intelligence collections missions [2]. This change in mission was 
a result of several factors, the most significant of which was the sheer difficulty of 
counter insurgency (COIN) operations centering on the locals, who represented a high 
risk of compromise, desert terrain providing sparse concealment, and occupied areas 
laced with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) [2].    
Due to technological advancements, several commanders, such as the I Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commanding General, desire Persistent Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PISR) assets to support long range, all weather, 
reduced footprint, and multi-sensor collections in any environment [3]. Ground 
reconnaissance forces may be limited in their ability to support PISR missions, whereas 
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) possess several permissive features. Several USMC 
entities and emerging intelligence concepts (Expeditionary Force 21 and the Marine 
Corps ISR Enterprise Roadmap) share common requests for UGS to have the capability 
and capacity to advance the collection of information, if employed correctly, utilized 
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properly, and equipped with state of the art technologies. Figure 1 displays an example of 
the current USMC capability for the employment of UGS by a Ground Sensor Platoon 
(GSP), able to support ground reconnaissance missions with Measurement and Signatures 
Intelligence (MASINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) collections [4]. 
 
Figure 1.  Doctrinal GSP Mission Vignette, after [4] 
For this example, the Sensor Employment Team (SET) receives tasking to employ 
UGS to collect intelligence on a Named Area of Interest (NAI), which is an area friendly 
forces will monitor because it holds value to the advisory’s course of action, or it has a 
relationship with one or more of the intelligence requirements [5]. The GSPs have limits 
in insert methods, stealth, security, size, maneuver inside the Area of Operations (AO), 
and requirement to place UGS close to the NAI for cueing of additional IMINT UGS [5]. 
The AO is an area assigned to a commander utilized to accomplish his mission and 
protect his forces [5]. One of the key strengths of this type of mission is the relatively 
shorter duration of Marines outside friendly lines, in comparison to that of a ground 
reconnaissance or infantry unit that could require more time in high-risk areas to 
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complete their mission. Additional strength includes the type of equipment they can use, 
the long battery life of the UGS, and the range of the collections capability with UGS.   
           Figure 2 displays a traditional ground reconnaissance (RECON) mission 
conducted by Marine reconnaissance elements. 
Figure 2.  Doctrinal Reconnaissance Team Mission Vignette, after [1] 
The ground reconnaissance units are limited by their technical capability, length 
of time for collections, and exposure to Marines outside friendly lines in comparison to 
the GSP mission [1]. However, the ground reconnaissance elements can utilize several 
more methods to access the battlespace, can operate in much smaller sized units, and can 
perform their missions beyond the AO and inside the Area of Interest (AI) [1]. The AI is 
the geographical area that contains enemy forces that can jeopardize the mission, which 
usually falls beyond the AO [5]. The AI is usually the area more focused on for 
intelligence collections, is usually non-permissive while portions of the AO might be 
semi-permissive or permissive [5]. Intelligence collections missions in the AI require 
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greater support and higher risk estimates due to their extended distances from friendly 
bases and threat estimates. Reconnaissance Marines also receive greater training in 
complex threat situations, which makes them more capable in operating in the AI with 
limited support [1].   
Analysis of the capabilities of the GSP and Marine reconnaissance units defines 
certain strengths for combining to achieve maximum potential for intelligence 
collections. Figure 3 displays a combination of the assets with commercial off the shelf 
equipment to augment the existing UGSs’ capability. 
 
Figure 3.  Hybrid UGS/Reconnaissance Team Vignette, after [1], [4]–[6] 
To support EF 21 with ground reconnaissance collections, UGS will need 
advanced communications features, extended IMINT collections ranges, and increased 
durability and flexibility to adapt to high threat areas. Figure 3 shows the use of ground 
reconnaissance Marines to employ COTS UGS, with great tactical expertise, increased 
variety of Special Insert and Extract (SPIE) methods, and small-sized elements to aid in 
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concealment for operations beyond the AO and in the AI. The COTS UGS contain video 
imaging capabilities for Full Motion Video (FMV) and Tilt Pan Zoom (TPZ) for a range 
of 3000 meters, which is three times that of the current range for USMC UGS [6]. Table 
1 is a comparison of the three missions displayed in Figure 1, 2, and 3.   
Table 1.   Ground Reconnaissance Mission Comparisons, after [1], [4]–[6] 
 
The hybrid mission outlined in Figure 3 surpasses the others in nearly all the 
examined categories, allowing for significant capabilities in IMINT and MASINT 
collections, and for the ground reconnaissance elements the collections of Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT), which is intelligence derived from collection or reporting from 
human sources [5]. The reason this is significant is that EF 21 requires this type of 
capability to support similar missions. EF 21 demands an increased level of flexibility for 
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Tasks Forces (SPMAGTFs) to deploy, adapt, and 
operate in a specified geographical region at any time [7]. To support this, the USMC 
Ground Sensor Platoon Reconnaissance Battalion
Hybrid (RECON Team with 
Unattended Ground Sensors 
(UGS))
1.  Maneuver Space
Limited to inside the Area of 
Operations (AO) in a semi-
permissive environment.
Capable of operating inside the 
AO and the Area of Interest (AI) in 
a non-permissive environment.
Capable of operating inside the 
AO and the AI in a non-permissive 
environment.
2.  Size
19x Marines:  6x Marines in a 
Sensor Employment Team (SET), 
13x Marines in a security 
element.
6x Marines:  one RECON Team. 6x Marines:  one RECON Team.
3.  Insert / Extract 
Methods
Dismounted, Motorized, Rotary 
Wing Air Craft (RW A/C).
Dismounted, Motorized, RW A/C, 
Helicopter Rope Suspension 
Techniques (HRST), Small Boats, 
Airborne, Combat Dive.
Dismounted, Motorized, RW A/C, 
HRST, Small Boats, Airborne, 
Combat Dive.
4.  Duration for 
Maneuver
Less than 48 hours  72-96 hours Less than 48 hours
5.  Duration of 
Collections
30-90 day battery life. 48-72 hours of observation.
30-90 day battery life, longer with 
solar panel technology.
6.  Imagery 
Intelligence (IMINT) 
Type
UGS capable of daytime Electro 
Optical (EO), nighttime Infrared 
(IR) stills.
Tactical camera capable of EO and 
IR stills.
Other COTS UGS capable of 
daytime EO and nighttime IR 
stills, Full Motion Video and Tilt 
Pan Zoom. 
7.  IMINT Range 1000 meters 300-500 meters 3000 meters
8.  Other Collections 
Capabilities
Measurement and Signature 
Intelligence (MASINT): Seismic, 
Acoustic, Magnetic, and IR UGS.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
HUMINT and MASINT: Seismic, 
Acoustic, Magnetic, radar, and IR 
UGS.
Ground Reconnaissance Mission Comparisons
Mission:  Conduct ground RECON on a point Named Area of Interest (NAI).
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needs a revamped on-the-ground UGS and reconnaissance capability to monitor enemy 
activity and collect vital intelligence. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze current/existing models for managing, 
employing, and sourcing UGS for the USMC while focusing on the technological 
advancements of the units, as well as the training, and current related mission sets offered 
by such technology insertions. This research examines the USMC’s best approaches 
toward asset integration for multi-source intelligence collections, specifically UGS as 
cueing assets, all to better support EF 21 intelligence collections missions. Potential 
benefits include doctrine updates and table of organization and table of equipment 
modifications. Units that can benefit from this research include Marine Corps System 
Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Intelligence Department for Headquarters USMC, and 
the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center. 
When analyzed as a part of the current intelligence collections concepts, UGS are 
under-utilized and misallocated in medium to high threat areas of interest. UGS contain 
immense potential, yet due to their low quantities and limited exposure, they have provided 
little impact on modern intelligence collections. This thesis analyzes and compares the 
units and individual Marine skillsets that employ UGS, and the different existing UGS 
technologies to determine better management for and employment of UGS to support 
intelligence collections missions in non-permissive environments beyond the AO.   
C. METHOD 
This thesis focuses on the evaluation of current organizational units relative to 
UGS employment, technologies associated with UGS, and a Systems Engineering (SE) 
approach to improve the use of such systems in the USMC for EF 21 intelligence 
collections. This analysis consists of the employment methods, management strategies, 
monitoring unit’s capabilities and systems, and conceptual integrations. A detailed 
analysis of the responsibilities and capabilities of the USMC’s intelligence battalions and 
reconnaissance battalions creates opportunities for new missions focused on the 
employment of multiple advanced UGS to aid in the answering of Commanders Critical 
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Information Requirements (CCIRs). Highly capable UGS can reduce the friendly force 
footprint while still maintaining or enhancing valuable intelligence collections as the 
USMC continues to support a wide range of mission sets. 
This thesis organizational structure is as follows: 
Chapter II:  Literature Analysis. This chapter explores the history, doctrine, and 
other key documents from the UGS and intelligence community for reference regarding 
the current capabilities of UGS and the demand for their use. Two main documents 
provide the literature foundation of this research, the Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21) 
Capstone Concept of March 2014 and the Marine Corps ISR-Enterprise (MCISR-E) 
Roadmap of April 2010. These two documents define a new concept for intelligence 
collection, asset management, and sensor integration based on the Service’s recent 
combat history fighting insurgents. The compilation of this literature presents compelling 
results for the demand of sensors at all levels and the integration of multiple sensors to 
enhance information flow and the intelligence cycle. However, current gaps exist in the 
employment methods, management, and sourcing of UGS, as well as the exploration of 
emerging and adaptive technologies. The use and ownership of UGS in the USMC cannot 
currently maintain pace with the concepts presented in EF 21 and MCISR-E Roadmap. 
Using these two documents as a new foundation for intelligence collections operations, 
extensive research was conducted to identify and highlight needed changes to the units 
owning UGS, the types and quantities of UGS available.  In addition, research also 
focused on the proper procedures and training for the monitoring and employment of 
these assets, as well as an overall evaluation of the UGS as an intelligence collection 
system in the USMC.   
The Naval Postgraduate Master’s Thesis Mobile Situational Awareness Tool: 
Unattended Ground Sensor Based Remote Surveillance System from September 2014 by 
Captains Bradley C. Palm and Ryan P. Richter, USMC, served as a guide with respect to 
UGS related to new emerging force protection capabilities for early warning detections. 
Although designed for a separate warfighting function in force protection, their research 
presents several results for an UGS system with potential to further PISR integration at 
the tactical level in multiple environments.    
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Chapter III:  Research Analysis. The research for this thesis required focusing on 
the units that owned and employed UGS, and the current technologies associated with 
UGS for the USMC, DOD, and the commercial sector. The units section discusses the 
structure, capabilities, and limitations of the intelligence battalions and reconnaissance 
battalions in the employment of UGS. Once the appropriate data set was collected, 
evaluation of employing and managing units was conducted with a review of the Training 
and Readiness Manuals for the intelligence and reconnaissance Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOSs) for the management of UGS. The technological section displays the 
current and other existing UGS for comparison of the qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of the current state of the art technologies. 
Chapter IV:  Systems Engineering Analysis. This chapter uses the information 
from Chapters II and III and the context of a SE analysis and design to discuss the best 
way to improve UGS in the USMC to support EF 21 intelligence collections missions.   
This thesis does not incorporate any analysis of U.S. Army UGS; although the 
Army and Marine services have many similarities, their current use of UGS differs 
significantly. The U.S. Army presently uses UGS primarily as a force protection asset 
and is revamping their doctrine and technologies to support intelligence collections, and 
is still debating who would own which UGS. All this makes for difficult analysis in 
comparison of the U.S. Army and USMC capabilities. In addition, although UGS 
integrate well with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for PISR missions, this thesis does 
not discuss the relationship between the two in detail. UGS may require deployment into 
areas where the air space is denied, rendering UAS useless. On account of this 
discrepancy and several other issues, the analysis or discussion of integration between 
UGS and UAS is not in this thesis. 
D. END STATE 
This thesis recommends a restructuring of the USMC surveillance units to employ 
emerging UGS capabilities more effectively. Potential benefits of this research include 
USMC structural and technological modifications that alter the service’s intelligence 
collections operations towards an increased quality and quantity of UGS for future 
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operations. This research produced results for recommendations in new systems for 
purchase, table of equipment and table of organizational modifications, and possibly 
doctrinal updates for the USMC.   
The result of this research presents a more effective system for the employment, 
management, and technologies associated with UGS in the USMC to support EF 21 
intelligence collections missions. Chapter IV displays a detailed plan for upgrades to the 
doctrine, organizations, training, materials, leadership, personnel, and facilities associated 
with UGS in the USMC. This thesis presents valid solutions to an existing problem that 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to review essential documents to formulate a 
background, explore relative concepts and visions, and lay a foundation for continued 
research in the relationship between UGS and ground reconnaissance. Exploration of key 
related documents will give definition to the unique and challenging roles for the 
management, employment, and ownership of UGS in the USMC. The organization of this 
chapter consists of three parts, the introduction, literature analysis, and conclusion. The 
introduction section contains this overview, followed by the historical background 
portion, then the supporting doctrine portion focused on the USMC’s intelligence 
collections, ground reconnaissance, and remote UGS publications. The historical and 
doctrine portions focus on UGS development, employment, mission planning, the ground 
reconnaissance/UGS relationship and concepts relative to this thesis.  
The literature analysis consists of four portions, each selected for its current 
relevancy to the USMC and UGS. The first portion reviews the Expeditionary Force 21 
Capstone to show the current and future USMC vision. The second portion reviews the 
Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Enterprise Roadmap to show the 
current and future USMC intelligence development plan. The third portion reviews the 
Mobile Situational Awareness Tool: UGS Based Remote Surveillance System thesis 
project to show the use of modern-day cell phone technology in UGS for infantry 
solutions. The last section summarizes the key points of this chapter. The end state of this 
chapter is a review of key events and documents that directly affect current and future 
UGS related roles, missions, and technologies for the USMC.   
B. HISTORY 
The implementation of UGS in the USMC originated during 1967 in the Vietnam 
War to advance the methods of surveillance and target acquisitions [4]. The development 
of UGS for this Low Intensity Conflict was driven by the lack of success with the U.S. 
Air Force’s Rolling Thunder campaigns (strategic bombing along the Ho Chi Min trail), 
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for the enemy still moved freely along the trail and executed successful ambushes around 
it [8]. The use of technology to advance ground intelligence collections revolutionized 
the flow of information on the battlefield while reducing the risk to soldiers. Although the 
use of UGS along the Ho Chi Min trail had limited success as part of a sporadic 
integrated barrier plan throughout over 40 miles of triple canopy jungle, more significant 
after action points were noted in the battle of Khe Sanh [8]. Due to a detailed and 
accurate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace plan called Niagara I, seismic and 
acoustic UGS were air delivered and emplaced by ground reconnaissance elements 
around the USMC’s 26th Marine Regiment’s defensive perimeter, focused on possible 
enemy ingress and egress routes. As the enemy began to attack, these UGS provided 
limited use for intelligence collections on enemy mortar and artillery positions; however, 
their value regarding enemy movement became an essential element contributing to the 
U.S. Marines victory [8]. These UGS provided the Marines an ability to gain indications 
and warnings of enemy advancements, to gain and maintain situational awareness on 
enemy movement of troops and equipment, target enemy forces, reduce friendly 
casualties, and collect valuable intelligence as to the enemy’s whereabouts and their 
future operations [8]. During Operations Desert Storm in 1991, UGS saw little use due to 
the fast-paced operations of a large-scale mechanized offensive, the engagement in the 
desert environment of Kuwait and Iraq (flat open terrain, limited enemy hiding locations), 
and the advanced use of satellites and aerial reconnaissance planes for IMINT 
collections. The U.S. military did resort back to Vietnam-era UGS employment 
techniques for OIF from 2002–2008 and OEF from 2001–2014 in Afghanistan to support 
COIN operations [9]. OIF saw the use of seismic, acoustic, magnetic, passive infrared, 
and short-range imaging UGS to support intelligence collections for infantry battalions 
focused on tracking enemy patterns of movement, counter indirect fire missions, and 
counter IED missions in desert and urban terrain. Similar UGS were used in OEF, with 
the addition of IMINT UGS with ranges of 200–300 meters (nearly triple that of the 
existing capability), to support infantry battalion operations as well as larger scale 
division operations for rear area security and pattern analysis missions. Throughout the 
span of these major conflicts, proper utilization and employment of UGS has provided 
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crucial intelligence to the warfighter. History has shown that with technological 
advancements, and in the hands of the right units, UGS can be employed to provide 
significant tactical surveillance and target acquisitions to aid in combat operations.   
C. DOCTRINE 
1. USMC Intelligence Collections Publication 
Solid understanding of ground reconnaissance operations, including the 
employment of UGS, requires extensive knowledge of military intelligence doctrine, a 
cornerstone of this being intelligence collections doctrine. The Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication (MCWP) 2–2: MAGTF Intelligence Collection of 2004 covers the 
fundamentals, collections requirements management, intelligence collection operations 
management, and planning and execution of USMC intelligence collections operations 
[10]. A thorough analysis of this document leads to several important concepts relative to 
ground reconnaissance and UGS operations. The first and major significant definition 
comes in Chapter 1: Fundamentals, with the definition of the USMC’s Intelligence Cycle, 
displayed in Figure 4, the driving force behind all USMC intelligence operations.   
 
Figure 4.  The Marine Corps Intelligence Cycle, from [10] 
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Chapter 1 goes on to state that the Intelligence Battalion Commander is 
responsible for the coordination, development, and dissemination of intelligence 
collection plan, which includes all UGS missions as well as the functioning of the 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) [10]. The SARC is utilized at the 
MAGTF level to monitor, command and control, and review / disseminate reporting from 
all ground reconnaissance operations. Additionally, this chapter highlights that both the 
GSP and ground reconnaissance forces are MAGTF level assets, which means they may 
be task organized to smaller elements for mission support but ultimately the MAGTF 
Commander owns them [10]. Chapter 2: Collections Requirements Management 
describes the planning and coordination of ground reconnaissance missions, the Division 
G-2 is tasked as the responsible officer [10]. Also discussed in this chapter are two key 
intelligence collections concepts relative to proper and successful collections operations, 
regardless of the type. The first are the collections strategies of cuing (one asset signals 
another), redundancy (two or more of the same type of assets collecting on one site), 
mixing (two or more different types of assets collecting on the same site), and integration 
(one asset passed to a secondary site for further collections) [10]. The second key 
fundamental point established are the basics for intelligence collection planning that 
consists of Intelligence Requirements, Indicators, Specific Information Requirements 
(SIRs), collections assets and resources to be employed, reporting criteria and 
instructions, and remarks [10]. On the surface, these may all sound similar and bland; 
however, each subject serves a powerful role in the definition of a successful collections 
plan. Chapter 3: Intelligence Collection Operations Management shows that there are 
several factors such as the environment, asset capabilities, range, and pattern of life 
factors all weight in when collection managers conduct asset tasking [10]. Ground 
reconnaissance units’ roles and missions are then defined, stressing the importance of 
establishing the SARC and associated reporting, most of which are focused are dated 
conventional warfare types (Size Activity Location Unit Time Equipment [SALUTE] 
Report hydrographic survey, beach survey, landing zone, and river report) [10]. MASINT 
is defined as the intelligence derived from qualitative and quantitative data sets collected 
by technical instruments from sources other than signals (sensors, radars, radiation, 
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temperature, etc.), noting that GSP with UGS is the only organic MASINT asset for the 
USMC [10]. Once the strategies are in place, the fundamentals are established, and the 
plan is set, the Intelligence Collections Synchronization Matrix is created, such as the 
example displayed in Figure 5.     
 
Figure 5.  Notional Intelligence Synchronization Matrix, from [10] 
Chapter 4: Planning and Execution, stresses the importance of ground 
reconnaissance and sensor implant missions to be well coordinated with fires and 
maneuver operations, which requires detailed planning and substantial contingencies 
[10]. This chapter also highlights that both the intelligence battalions and reconnaissance 
battalions are required to task organize their forces to support MAGTFs smaller than a 
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MEF, which means they must be able to detach small sized elements (company, platoons, 
teams) to support other units [10]. Appendix C contains a sample Collection Plan that 
presents some interesting details relative to ground reconnaissance and UGS operations. 
The tasks for the force reconnaissance company state that they are responsible to implant 
UGS, and yet GSP is not, which was a dated concept that creates minor friction and 
controversy between the units [10]. Contrary to Appendix C, Appendix D, a Sample 
Collections Update Paragraph for intelligence summary shows GSP being responsible for 
the emplacement of UGS [10]. Although this publication is in need of updates and 
presents some conflicting points relative to ground reconnaissance and UGS 
employment, it serves as a cornerstone for USMC intelligence doctrine and is well 
utilized in today’s real-world operations.   
2. USMC Ground Reconnaissance Operations Publication 
The MCWP 2–25: Ground Reconnaissance Operations (DRAFT), of 2012, details 
specifics related to full spectrum operations, units and organization, command and 
control, mission development, operational types and planning, methods of maneuver, 
communications, and intelligence operations and reporting dissemination for 
expeditionary ground reconnaissance missions [1]. Almost immediately, the forward 
displays the importance of ground reconnaissance units using UGS, which as shown 
through review of the MCWP 2–2, can present issues between them and GSP [1], [10]. A 
step in the right direction for categorizing ground reconnaissance assets presents in 
Chapter 2:  Units and Organizations, which lists GSP as a ground reconnaissance asset, 
not just a MASINT asset as shown in the MCWP 2–2 [1], [10]. However, it does not 
show that GSP employs the UGS, and that they train others to do so, leaving the force 
reconnaissance company with the task to implant and recover UGS [1]. Command and 
control is an important warfighting function and often times a burden, however the 
updates in roles and terminology, such as Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coordination 
Center (SARCC) (vice the SARC noted in both the MCWP 2–2 and MCRP 2–24B) gives 
new life to structure not seen previously [1], [4],  [10]. Figure 6 shows the SARCC as 
part of the Intelligence Operations Center.   
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Figure 6.  Intelligence Operations Center, from [1] 
Chapter 5: Operations, highlights the different ground reconnaissance operations 
and their associated tasks as displayed in Table 2 [1].   
Table 2.   Ground Reconnaissance Tasks by Operation, from [1] 
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This is important in Chapter III of this thesis during the evaluation of capabilities 
for both ground reconnaissance units and GSP. Interesting to the thesis, yet in a slightly 
different direction, this chapter describes Hunter Killer Operations and in doing so notes 
the importance of ground reconnaissance forces being equipped with state of the art 
sensor and counter sensor technology [1]. Chapter 8: Intel Operations and Reporting 
Dissemination, reviews the topic of sensor data set management, where it states that 
ground reconnaissance Marines emplace UGS, not GSP Marines [1]. This same chapter 
details the monumental importance of intelligence cohesiveness, stressing that 
intelligence as a warfighting function is a team effort and UGS must be implanted to 
support ground reconnaissance operations [1]. The chapter continues on to state in the 
MASINT section that GSP is to provide logistical, maintenance, and monitoring 
equipment for UGS, and that ground reconnaissance units will emplace UGS in the 
surveillance area [1]. With a clear understanding of the doctrinal relationship between 
ground reconnaissance units and employment concepts, a thorough analysis can be 
conducted in Chapter III of this thesis to depict the best possible options for UGS 
employment and management, as seen in Chapter I, Figure 3. 
3. USMC Remote Unattended Ground Sensors Publication 
The Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 2–24: Remote Sensor 
Operations, updated in 2004, covers key UGS related topics such as the fundamentals, 
the Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS), Command and Control of, planning for, the 
execution of, and training for remote UGS operations. The USMC’s doctrine on UGS and 
UGS-employment is dated, as most of the publication is extracted from the 1997 version; 
however, it still provides a noteworthy base for the planning and execution of UGS 
operations [4]. Chapter 3: Command and Control of Remote Sensor Operations, offers 
relative facts for the establishment of multiple integrated networks to facilitate sensor 
reporting, while indicating the need for Sensor Monitoring Sites to be supported by 
infantry units and implant missions to be supported by ground reconnaissance units, as 
displayed in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  Sensor Control Agencies, from [4] 
Chapter 4: Planning for Remote Sensor Operations, emphasizes the importance of 
planning for UGS operations, the development of a sensor surveillance plan, sensor 
employment plan, the use of the sensor employment planning cycle, and the socialization 
of this plan through the proper chain-of-command [4]. Figure 8 depicts the Sensor 
Employment Planning Cycle, which is tied to all sensor reporting and missions. 
  
Figure 8.  Sensor Employment Planning Cycle, from [4] 
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Despite Chapter 2 on TRSS covering the old technologies used, this publication 
contains well-structured post-Vietnam era planning concepts and formats that were well 
utilized by GSP commanders in OIF and OEF. Chapter 5: Execution of Remote Sensor 
Operations, describes the importance of proper accomplishment of UGS operations, the 
importance of their information collected for future operations and the networking of 
communications to ensure the UGS are able to collaborate and report the data sets [4]. 
Next, the chapter underscores the value of an approved UGS employment plan to ensure 
the collected intelligence gains proper dissemination, and the significance of UGS 
emplacement missions to ensure success of the overall surveillance plan [4]. Chapter 2: 
TRSS, is the most out-of-date portion of this publication; although it describes the TRSS 
quite well, the technology discussed is very old and outdated [4]. As the technology has 
been upgraded, the doctrine has been only slightly modified, which implies that the lack 
of recent updates for this MCRP shows solid foundational concepts for the planning and 
employment UGS, regardless of their type. This publication needs updates and 
modifications on current units, missions, and responsibilities, which would also serve as 
an opportunity for the TRSS capabilities to be presented while the technical specifics are 
left in the Technical Manuals. The relationship between doctrine and technology is 
constantly morphing, for UGS the two need to be separated, leaving the doctrine to focus 
on UGS role in intelligence operations and the Technical Manuals to focus on the 
equipment specifics, for as one changes it does not necessarily require updates from the 
other. One area where this publication is vague is in Chapter 5: Execution of Remote 
Senor Operations, for it lays out general parameters and considerations for the 
employment of UGS, yet when compared to doctrine for snipers or ground 
reconnaissance Marines, it lacks specifics for field-craft, maneuver, mission graphics, and 
formations of units [4]. Although this section only covers the basics, it does not 
negatively influence the sensor community, for it now drives the GSP commander to 
develop new, specific Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for their unique missions 
and environments. The history and doctrine for UGS shows great methods and concepts 
for the use of UGS on the battlefield; coupled with modern concepts and technology, 
these fields can serve as great examples for future missions to increase the amount and 
roles of UGS employed while reducing risk to Marines.   
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D. LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
1. Expeditionary Force 21 Capstone 
The EF 21 Capstone presents newly organized guidance and planning specifics 
for how the USMC should prepare itself for future operations in the next ten years. This 
document emphasizes that it does not change what Marines do, but how they do it, 
allowing the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) the ability to provide the right 
force for the right place at the right time [7]. The reinforcement of the USMC’s ability to 
be expeditionary in purpose, to operate in austere conditions, and the ability to maintain 
strong partnerships with the U.S. Navy to maneuver throughout the littoral terrain to 
support crisis response missions are the foundation of this capstone [7]. From the history 
review, UGS role in Vietnam, OIF, and OEF environments were to support intelligence 
collections for COIN operations; EF 21 presents a similar opportunity yet now for crisis 
response operations. EF 21 displays a new plan to align its forces for geographical 
support, better allowing its units to focus on specific threats and terrain as well as 
aligning the services support structure to fit the specific needs of the GCCs [7], as 
depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  EF 21: Poised for Response, from [7] 
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More specific to this thesis, EF 21 goes on to outline the new unique requirements 
of the warfighting functions, including that of intelligence. This section stresses the 
importance of intelligence related to EF 21 to be scalable, integrated in service and joint, 
capable to utilizing the latest technology, be responsive, and adaptive to the GCC’s needs 
[7]. Similar to the review of UGS doctrine, there is a strong emphasis still today placed 
on the increased integration of UGS into maneuver operations, as well as the intelligence 
tailored for the commander, or for EF 21 the GCC. Furthermore, it highlights areas of 
enhancement such as sensors, fusion, integration, and analysis [7].  
EF 21 holds true as a model for future operations based on the USMC’s structure, 
the current political environment, and service capabilities. Highlighting the importance of 
the right force for the right job right now, this document postures the USMC to be 
flexible and agile for any mission or political change [7]. One element that may present 
challenges is the point on a need for a defined integration of Special Operational Forces 
(SOF) and Marine reconnaissance elements to aid capability increases and preparation of 
battlespace environments [7]. This topic has been well discussed and debated over the 
years; although logical in presentation due to the two communities many similarities, 
SOF has uniquely different mission sets, operate under different statutes, and have much 
different support networks then conventional elements. This capstone presents great 
guidance and focused areas for enhancement, yet it only contains one comment regarding 
the evaluation of this capstone annually [7]. The reader is left to wonder how it will be 
enforced, evaluated, bolstered, and achieved throughout the next ten years. The EF 21 
Capstone appears to be missing a detailed timeline and task list designed to hold certain 
representatives accountable for achieving performance-based measures underlined in this 
document, signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If such a task list does exist, 
it should be listed in the capstone or in an appropriate annex to instill faith in the reader 
that there is a plan in place for detailed and successful execution.   
EF 21 serves as the charted pathway for the USMC’s future conduct of 
operations, mindset, and guidance for the planning and training of forces. The section on 
intelligence presents several key tenants and issues that need to be addressed to foster 
progression in commensurate levels. Related to UGS, the points on integration, sensor 
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requirements, networking, upgrades, and fusion relate heavily to this thesis [7]. To better 
fuse intelligence with operations, to become more integrated and persistent, to lead to 
better analysis and dissemination of information, UGS can aid in all of these aspects, 
given accurate credit and consideration. Although this document tasks the USMC 
Intelligence Community to define the specifics, EF 21 calls for increased use of, 
advanced capabilities in, and new methods of employment for both UGS and ground 
reconnaissance units. In response, Chapter III explores integration of UGS with ground 
reconnaissance units, advanced equipment for ground PISR missions, and unit 
capabilities to support EF 21. 
2. Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Enterprise 
Roadmap 
The MCISR-E Roadmap establishes the framework for service level guidance 
toward the progression and integration of intelligence throughout all the other 
warfighting functions to support future operations to 2025 and beyond [11]. Although 
developed as an annex to the Marine Corps Campaign Plan for 2025, developed in 2010, 
this document now falls under EF 21. This current version has updates from 2012, and 
there has recently been a new MCISR-E Plan 2015–2020 published, however for the 
purpose of this thesis the 2010 version will be the main document analyzed do to its 
structure and detail. The guidance in this roadmap is followed by tasks, with associated 
timelines to hold respective agencies accountable for the progression of newly 
established upgrades for the USMC intelligence community [11]. Most notably, this 
roadmap gives clear intent toward the upgrades of systems, technology, and the 
integration of both for intelligence collections and analysis. Following which, this 
roadmap concludes with a well-organized display of its concepts as subsets to the core 
components of the Marine Corps Campaign Plan for 2025, simple in design yet speaks 
volumes when analyzed in respect for the execution of higher headquarters intent.  
The concept of MCISR-E and this roadmap emerged in a time when the USMC 
was shifting to new roles and battling new responsibilities with an undetermined future. 
When the guidance came, this roadmap was formed and came with it the task list, able to 
hold elements accountable to see this plan through completion, with several opportunities 
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for evaluations and modifications [11]. However, there is no mention of ground 
reconnaissance, its future changes, advancement of roles, or organizational structure 
changes. This document highlights that Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Plans 
Policies and Operations (PP&O), has the MCISR-E full support, but it never states for 
what it has support, nor does it give any intent under which PP&O could make reference 
[11]. If ground reconnaissance is to be a subset of intelligence in reality and not just on 
paper than the intelligence community needs to take greater ownership of this element. 
One element that is inconclusive in this document is the establishment of the Battlefield 
Surveillance Company (BSC) [11]. The roadmap states that the BSC will be developed 
from existing structure to integrate UGS with moving target indicators, but it never really 
states why. This combination of Intelligence Collections means has been done to a 
limited a degree in the past, but when this document references the creation of a new 
force with state of the art technology, several questions arise as to the cause, need, 
justification, and timing of the task.  
This document harnesses a strong relationship with the role of UGS in the USMC 
because of it is clear, pivotal, well-structured guidance from the USMC’s Director of 
Intelligence. Discussions regarding the importance of technological advancements for 
intelligence, development of a BSC for each intelligence battalion, and the role and 
importance of PISR for today’s intelligence collections operations all set conditions for 
the advancement and development of UGS and UGS employment concepts in the today’s 
service [11]. The MCISR-E operational concept graphic, depicted in Figure 10, shows the 
use of PISR forward deployed, as well as ground reconnaissance and MASINT, 
representing ground reconnaissance units and GSP with UGS respectfully.   
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Figure 10.  MCISR-E Overview, from [11] 
Due to their depiction in the Figure 10, one can infer that ground reconnaissance 
and UGS are crucial elements to the future of intelligence operations in MCISR-E. 
Chapter III of this thesis analyzes the BSC construct, new UGS and UGS employment 
techniques, and the incorporation of ground reconnaissance units for completion of the 
guidance for these specific areas outlined in the MCISR-E Roadmap.  
3. Mobile Situational Awareness Tool: UGS Based Remote Surveillance 
System 
The referenced thesis explores the use of newly developed cellphone based 
technologies and emerging UGS capabilities to assist in Listening Post/ Observation Post 
(LP/OP) operations, an infantry force protection measure that is as old as warfare itself 
[12]. The two USMC combat arms officers address this problem through the design of 
the Mobile Situational Awareness Tool (MSAT) as a technological solution to the 
physical LP/OP problem, with the MSATs implementation and testing concluding their 
analysis and findings [12]. Exploring the option of enhancing human resources with 
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devices, and straying outside the current USMC program of record for UGS, this merger 
of current wireless technology with state of the art UGS for combat operations is a unique 
direction that sparks several possibilities and promising options for UGS advancements. 
Although this thesis is more technical than the other two previous reviewed literature 
works, it proposes the union of technology with military missions, serving as a thought-
provoking example for possible upgrades to current USMC UGS for the EF 21 and 
MCISR-E demands. 
The most potent aspect of this thesis is how it explores the use of UGS to solve 
combat operations maneuver warfare problems, to use technology to augment the 
employment of soldiers, and to optimize the use of equipment for reduction of risk to 
personnel [12]. Although the thesis references the USMC’s TRSS, it analyzes the 
equipment noted in the USMC publication and technical manuals, which is dated [12]. 
This thesis does not explore the realm of UGS equipment that the current fleet units have 
in their possession, nor does it discuss the equipment tested for future fielding by the 
MARCORSYSCOM. One area that could use more explanation is why the MSAT 
technology was chosen for research and analysis. Although well documented and tested 
in this thesis, the use of cellular and WiFi wireless technology in austere conditions may 
prove difficult for USMC operations [12]. The use of MSAT to support infantry 
operations is well researched in this thesis; however, the use of MSAT to support 
intelligence collections is not. TRSS and UGS employment is traditionally an intelligence 
collections field, although utilized for force protection missions quite often; it creates 
several ripple effects regarding asset management: if you are using your intelligence 
collections assets for force protection missions, then what are you using for your 
intelligence collections missions?   
This thesis is extremely valuable to the future advancements of UGS and UGS 
employment because it explores new possibilities for technological integration with 
modern day operations. This research is unique to the establishment of a WiFi network 
for use in combat operations and one networked with UGS for a PISR capability. 
Evaluation of this technology, compared to existing and currently acquired equipment for 
the USMC, will present a strong argument for advance research in this focused direction. 
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One of the most frustrating situations for military professionals is to see civilian use of 
everyday modern technology while a similar capability for the military is bulky, rustic, 
cumbersome, and not user friendly. Here we have an example of cell phone based 
technology that can be utilized to advance the warfighters capabilities for PISR 
operations in hostile environments.  
E. CONCLUSION 
As technology continues to advance, and the world continues to adapt, the USMC 
will consistently require new and innovative ways to aid in intelligence collections in 
support of combat operations as well as humanitarian missions. The use of UGS in future 
warfare especially that of USMC expeditionary operations for crisis response missions, is 
virtually limitless. Analysis of the EF 21 Capstone and the MCISR-E Roadmap stress that 
the USMC’s intelligence community demands adoption or adaption of new and emerging 
technologies utilized to reduce risk on the battlefield. The MSAT thesis opens the 
reader’s eyes to possibilities while modeling the use of current cell phone technology 
used in UGS for LP/OP missions. The literature, doctrine, and history all show how the 
use of sensors for ground surveillance has vast potential when planned, employed, and 
managed effectively. Advanced UGS in the hands of capable ground reconnaissance 
Marines possess a unique capability to employ the most current technology for ground 
surveillance missions to enhance asset management and increase situational awareness. 
The literature analysis of this chapter, combined with the research collected in Chapter 
III, set the stage for the development of the system engineering concept design for 
Chapter IV, highlighting the importance and relationship of these chapters.    
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III. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the research conducted relative to units that use UGS and 
certain technologies associated with UGS to support intelligence collections missions for 
EF 21. This research, combined with the analysis of the key literature pieces in Chapter 
II, serves as a basis for the systems engineering analysis in Chapter IV, which is to assess 
ways to improve the use of UGS in the USMC for EF 21. The USMC’s operating forces 
are divided into three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), Marine Special Operations 
Command (MARSOC) and Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). The units that use 
UGS are the intelligence battalions and reconnaissance battalions, which one of each 
support the MEFs and MARFORES while an additional Intelligence Battalion support 
MARSOC, as shown in Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11.  Marine Corps Intelligence Overview, from [11] 
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The intelligence battalions have owned and managed UGS Marines since the 
1980s. The reconnaissance battalions employed UGS for the USMC during the Vietnam 
War, and since then have always been capable of and ready to employ UGS in support of 
combat operations. The intelligence battalions have been using TRSS equipment since 
the 1980s; however, other units have purchased and employed UGS of various types to 
support their own specific intelligence collections desires. Additionally, the military 
purchases, tests, and employs COTS equipment to support surveillance operations of 
various types. This chapter will evaluate the current units that use UGS, and current UGS 
to assess their level of functionality and readiness to support new demanding intelligence 
collections missions for EF 21. For the units, this chapter will describe and compare the 
UGS specific capabilities of the USMC’s intelligence battalions and reconnaissance 
battalions, to include their Marines. For the UGS technologies, this chapter will describe 
and compare the UGS associated with TRSS, COTS equipment, and the DARPA 
ADAPT UGS to determine which technologies or combinations thereof will best support 
the USMC for EF 21 intelligence collections. This chapter is a summarization of research 
essential to the associated UGS units and technologies to be applied to a system 
engineering analysis solution for advancements in the UGS field to support EF 21.   
B. ORGANIZATIONS 
This section will review the key common topics of the USMC’s UGS employing 
units.   
1. Intelligence Battalions 
The USMC currently has four active duty intelligence battalions and one in 
reserve that is known as the Intelligence Support Battalion for their primary role is as 
Intelligence enablers and augmentations. Minus the one intelligence battalion with 
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), each of the units contains one GSP. 
The mission of the intelligence battalion is to 
plan and direct, collect, process, produce and disseminate intelligence, and 
provide counterintelligence support to the MEF Command Element, MEF 
Major Subordinate Commands, subordinate Marine Air Ground Task 
Forces (MAGTF), and other commands, as directed. [13] 
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The intelligence battalions are currently the only unit in the USMC that have UGS 
organic to their authorized Table of Equipment and is the only unit in the DOD that has 
Surveillance Sensor Operators, service members solely dedicated to the employment and 
emplacement of UGS. Recently, within the guidance of the MCISR-E Roadmap, the 
intelligence battalions created the BSC to provided additional leadership and oversight to 
the development and execution of UGS and MASINT operations for the MEFs. This new 
BSC structure places key intelligences subject matter experts in leadership and advisory 
roles over the GSPs, as well as Intelligence Specialists at the squad level for the GSPs, as 
shown in Figure 12.   
 
Figure 12.  Battlespace Surveillance Company Table of Organization, from [14] 
Each GSP contains three Sensor Employment Squads (SESs), with each squad 
containing two Sensor Employment Teams (SETs) and each SET containing six Marines. 
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The SETs are capable of conducting limited maneuver operations on their own, as most 
missions will require support for insert and extract of the SET and additional security 
elements while conducting operations in hostile areas. Although the SETs could 
theoretically operate as their own maneuver element, training requirements and recent 
history do not support this theory. In relation, this could prove difficult for the SETs and 
GSPs to support independent operations in hostile areas for EF 21 intelligence collections 
missions if they require extensive support for UGS emplacement and recovery missions.   
a. Unit Training 
As per the Intelligence Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual, the Intelligence 
Battalions contain the one and only battalion level Mission Essential Task (MET) for 
UGS, which is to conduct ground sensor operations [15]. For this single battalion level 
MET, it contains one platoon level UGS specific task, four squad-level Intel-related 
tasks, and one team level UGS specific task. Relative to surveillance operations, this is a 
very small number of associated tasks and sub tasks for operations that risk the 
employment of Marines in hostile areas; however, this is not necessarily a negative factor 
for an abundance of tasks may only complicate the issue. Additionally, several infantry 
training and readiness events need to be factored into the individual training events for 
the Surveillance Sensor Operators.   
b. Individual Training 
As per the current MOS Manual, the MOS of 8621: Surveillance Sensor Operator 
is one of three MOSs in the USMC with UGS related tasks, but is the only MOS specific 
to UGS ownership and monitoring. The summary of this MOS states, Surveillance Sensor 
Operators inspect, install, operate, and perform operator maintenance on surveillance 
equipment prior to and after employment [16]. Their duties are listed as:  
1. Prepares various types of remote sensor surveillance devices for air and 
hand emplacement methods in areas previously determined. 
2. Monitors and interprets sensor devices by reading out audio and visual 
transmissions. 
3. Plots sensor string locations on maps and overlays. 
4. Makes recommendations to and assists the intelligence officer in selecting 
areas, routes, and specific sites to be employed. 
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5. Provides timely and accurate data concerning enemy location, direction, 
speed of movement, and strength. 
6. Recommends appropriate action and reaction to be taken and calls fire 
missions on valid targets acquired. 
7. Assists in testing and evaluating new sensor surveillance equipment and 
ancillary devices. 
8. Provides surveillance equipment instruction. [16] 
Additionally, the MOS Manual highlights that Surveillance Sensor Operators may 
come from a variety of MOS backgrounds (intelligence, infantry, and communications), 
and that it is a secondary MOS, which means Marines will only do this for a select time 
frame in their career and will then have to return to their primary MOS [16]. Marines that 
meet the prerequisites of the primary MOS, security clearance, and graduation from the 
Surveillance Sensor Operators Course (SSOC) in Dam Neck Virginia will then receive 
the 8621 MOS. To assess the current potential of the Surveillance Sensor Operators to 
support UGS operations for EF 21, analysis of this MOS will focus on the MOS 0300 
Basic Infantryman and MOS 0311 Rifleman skills in addition to those of the Surveillance 
Sensor Operators. Although the fields of MOS 0231: Intelligence Specialist  and MOS 
0621: Field Radio Operator can also achieve the MOS 8621, the Infantry MOS provides a 
better analysis of field craft and tactical skills, which make up the majority of the GSPs 
and will be in high demand to meet the expectations of EF 21 intelligence collections 
missions. Each Rifleman must first go through MOS 0300 Basic Infantryman training at 
the School of Infantry (SOI), which is why this is included in the quantitative depiction 
and qualitative analysis of the Surveillance Sensor Operator. Specific to the Surveillance 
Sensor Operator, the training and readiness events used for analysis will be the individual 
events, 1000 level and 2000 level, as shown and described in Figure 13.   
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Figure 13.  Training & Readiness Event Levels, from [15] 
Analysis of the 1000 level training and readiness events for the MOS 0300 is not 
needed for this thesis as both the Surveillance Sensor Operators and MOS 0321s 
Reconnaissance Man Marines go through this training. Table 3 shows the select 1000 and 
2000 level training and readiness events for the MOSs 0300/0311/8621 that apply 




Table 3.   Surveillance Sensor Operator Training Events List, after [15] 
 
 
Note that out of all the 112 individual training and readiness events for the MOS 
8621, only 11 (9.8%) are specific to UGS, with another seven (6.3%) closely related, and 
an additional four (3.6%) training and readiness events specific to intelligence [15]. 
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Although the quantity may be low, the quality is significant as these numbers exceed all 
other units for UGS related tasks. In addition, these UGS specific tasks have been 
thoroughly evaluated and updated over the past ten years to ensure quality control. 
Additionally, tactical skill sets to support maneuver operations for the emplacement 
implant and recovery of UGS to support EF 21 type missions include ten patrolling 
training and readiness events (8.9%), eight events for combat hunter (7.1%), seven events 
for communications (6.25%), 20 events for weapons (17.9%), and ten events for tactical 
vehicles (8.9%) [15]. With these statistics, Surveillance Sensor Operator training and 
readiness events include 22 events (19.6%) specific to UGS employment and 55 events 
(49.1%) specific to the tactical demands of conducting UGS missions to support EF 21 
intelligence collections operations [7], [15]. Additionally, 35 events (31.3%) support 
individual MOS 8621 training and readiness actions for EF 21 related missions [15].   
2. Reconnaissance Battalions 
The USMC currently has three active duty reconnaissance battalions, one 
supporting each Marine Division, and one reserve battalion supporting 4
th
 Marine 
Division, MARFORRES. Additionally, there are three active-duty force reconnaissance 
companies with one supporting each MEF and two reserve force reconnaissance 
companies. The mission of the reconnaissance battalions or elements thereof, is 
to conduct advanced force operations, underwater reconnaissance, 
amphibious reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, surveillance, battle 
space shaping, and specialized limited scale raids in support of the Marine 
Division, Marine Expeditionary Force, or designated MAGTFs[1].  
The mission of the force reconnaissance companies relatively the same as that of 
the reconnaissance battalions, only difference being that the force reconnaissance 
companies support the MEF, other MAGTFs, or the Marine component of a Joint Force 
or Joint Task Force [1]. 
Both ground reconnaissance units contain the following METs: 
 MET 1: Provide task-organized forces. 
 MET 2: Conduct amphibious reconnaissance and surveillance. 
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 MET 3: Conduct ground reconnaissance and surveillance. 
 MET 4: Conduct battlespace shaping operations. 
 MET 5: Conduct specialized limited scale raids. 
 MET 6: Conduct specialized insertion and extraction. 
 MET 7: Establish means for command and control. [17] 
The structure of the reconnaissance battalion (as displayed in Figure 14) contains 
four companies, one of which is a headquarters company while the other three are ground 
reconnaissance companies, each containing four reconnaissance platoons. The force 
reconnaissance companies each contain one headquarters platoon and four force 
reconnaissance platoons. The active-duty force reconnaissance companies are in an 
Administrative Control (ADCON) relationship with their geographically located 
reconnaissance battalion, which implies that they rely on the reconnaissance battalions 
for extensive administrative and logistical support. The force reconnaissance companies 
also remain in an Operational Control (OPCON) status to their respective MEF, always 
available for tasking and support. The reserve force reconnaissance companies remain in 
an OPCON and ADCON status under MARFORRES. Each reconnaissance platoon, from 
both the reconnaissance battalions and force reconnaissance companies, consists of three 
teams of six Marines and all teams are capable of serving as independent maneuver 
elements in support of combat operations.   
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Figure 14.  Reconnaissance Battalion Organizational Chart, from [1] 
a. Unit Training 
The reconnaissance battalions are responsible for two training and readiness 
events specific to the employment of UGS, one of which is a squad level event and the 
other is a platoon level event, both of which are worded as to conduct sensor implant and 
recovery [17]. These events do not highlight the requirement to monitor nor maintain the 
UGS. As needed and when tasked to do so, the GSPs will train infantry and 
reconnaissance Marines in the use of the UGS, allowing them the ability to implant and 
recover the UGS. Additionally, the Reconnaissance Training and Readiness Manual lists 
the core capabilities for key billets, nine of these billets contain the task to implant and 
recover UGS. In relation, Appendix C (C-1 to C-16) of the Intelligence Training and 
Readiness Manual breaks down specific intelligence training and readiness events that 
support the METs of the GCE battalions, which is a great training reference for 
commanders and intelligence officers to task and train their intelligence sections 
accordingly. With the Intelligence Training and Readiness Manual being the primary 
source of UGS specific events, not one of these events is specifically tasked to any of the 
reconnaissance battalion METs. This is important because it shows no direct relationship 
or tasking for the reconnaissance battalion or force reconnaissance companies 
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intelligence sections to support or coordinate UGS training or missions with the GSPs. 
This role would then be executed by the unit’s operations officers, should it be needed. In 
summary, the reconnaissance battalions and force reconnaissance companies have six 
complex and intense METs to train for, leaving little room for untasked UGS training 
under current training and operational standards. 
b. Individual MOS Training 
The majority of the reconnaissance battalion’s Marines are of the MOS 0321:  
Reconnaissance Man. The MOS Manual summarizes this MOS, stating that 
the Reconnaissance Man is an infantry Marine skilled in amphibious 
reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance. In addition to basic infantry 
skills, he possesses proficiency in scout swimming, small boat operations 
and refined observation, scouting, patrolling and long-range 
communications skills. Reconnaissance Men receive advanced training as 
Static Line and Military Free-Fall Parachutists and Jumpmasters, as well 
as Combatant Divers and Diving Supervisors. [16]  
As a Reconnaissance Man completes the advance Airborne and Combatant Diver 
training, he will receive additional MOS designators (such as the MOS 0326: 
Reconnaissance Man, Parachute and Combatant Diver Qualified), however for the 
purpose of this thesis, all skill sets will be covered in reference to the MOS 0321 field. 
Timing and career progression dictates when a Reconnaissance Man will complete the 
SPIE schools. Similar to the table for the Surveillance Sensor Operators, Table 4 shows a 
breakdown of the individual training and readiness events for the Reconnaissance Man. 
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Table 4.   Reconnaissance Man Training Events List, after [17] 
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The Reconnaissance Man MOS contains over three times as many individual 
events as that of the Surveillance Sensor Operator, several of which are related to 
intelligence, communications, and the operation of advanced technical devices. These 
fields, along with weapons skills and tactics are all utilized in UGS implant and recovery 
operations, especially in support of operations such as those related to EF 21. However, 
there is not one individual event specific to UGS for the MOS 0321. This MOS has 
several similar skills that match or exceed those of the UGS specific events for the 
Surveillance Sensor Operators, many of which require advanced tactical and technical 
skills. This is not necessarily negative, for the task to conduct UGS operations is in the 
platoon and squad level events. One possible assessment is that it is not needed because 
of the Reconnaissance Man’s average level of exposure to advanced technical equipment 
such as new radios, computers, and fire control systems, would imply that if a mission 
arose for UGS, because of their other training in similar fields the individual would be 
quick to learn. Thus, leaving the employment of UGS as a unit task for the 
reconnaissance battalions, this is contrary to the Surveillance Sensor Operator’s field that 
contains both unit and individual training and readiness events pertaining to the SME role 
for UGS. Reconnaissance Men are true tactical experts, able to use infantry, intelligence, 
and communications skills with stealth techniques to operate in high-risk conditions. 
Several of these factors could be applied to the UGS community to expand their support 
reach for EF 21.   
3. MOS Comparative Analysis 
Now that the Surveillance Sensor Operator and Reconnaissance Man MOSs have 
been defined, the next step is to compare and contrast the two MOSs to evaluate which 
one can best support UGS operations for EF 21 intelligence collections missions. 
Evaluation of both MOSs creates certain categories for the 1000 and 2000 level training 
and readiness events, as displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   Training and Readiness Event Grouping, after [15], [17] 
 
 
The main groups of training and readiness events for evaluation are Weapons; 
Command, Control, and Communication (C3); Intelligence; Maneuver; and Readiness. 
The Reconnaissance Man field contains almost twice as many training and readiness 
events for each group, with four times as many events for the Weapons category and six 
times as many events for Intelligence. Refer to Figure 17 for the displayed quantitative 
comparisons of the two MOSs.   
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Figure 15.  MOS Comparison Graph, after [15], [17] 
This data set indicates that the average Reconnaissance Man is more skilled in 
advanced maneuver and intelligence collections than the average Surveillance Sensor 
Operator. The reality is that no single unit can train each of its Marines in every single 
one of these events; even though the training and readiness manuals define the minimum 
number of events Marines should train to prior to combat operations. Additionally, 
HQMC will prioritize to which events a unit will train, which can vary between the 
battalions due to geographical location and assigned missions. With EF 21, each battalion 
would have different training requirements due to its geographical assignments. 
Assessing the two MOS shows that even though Reconnaissance Man field does not have 
any individual level training and readiness events specific to UGS, they have several 
similar events and many more events of increased complexity requiring smart and mature 
Marines. Additionally, there are almost nine times as many Reconnaissance Men as there 
are Surveillance Sensor Operators in the USMC, and the Reconnaissance Man MOS is 
permanent, unlike Surveillance Sensor Operators. This is important because it shows the 
demand signal of the two MOSs, which also justifies a specific training and readiness 
manual for reconnaissance Marines and units while  Surveillance Sensor Operators share 
training and readiness manuals with the Infantry and Intelligence communities. Contrary 
to the comparison of capabilities, the average Reconnaissance Man will have several 
tasks and training requirements to complete as well as high-risk training and SPIE 
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methods that require a significant amount of time. The average Surveillance Sensor 
Operator will be allowed to focus solely on UGS and UGS missions alone, leading them 
to become true subject matter experts for UGS in the USMC.   
C. TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH 
We next analyze some of the current technological equipment used with UGS in 
the commercial and DOD fields. This chapter explores the types, detection ranges, 
communications ranges, software applications, and weights associated with these UGS. 
The USMC currently owns and operates the TRSS, which contains various UGS and 
communications monitoring equipment for the GSPs. The leading COTS vendor for UGS 
is McQ, producer of UGS for intelligence collections and force protection utilized by 
several government agencies and civilian companies alike. The Defense Advance 
Research Project Agency (DARPA) has developed special UGS known as the Adaptable 
Sensor System (ADAPT) to serve in an innovative method as nonlethal mines. Each of 
the three select types of UGS systems are described in this chapter, as well as some other 
related surveillance equipment. Following is a comparison and analysis of these UGS in 
relation to their current relevance and tactical application in support of EF 21 intelligence 
collections missions.   
1. TRSS Overview 
The USMC has been using TRSS equipment since the 1980s, which gives great 
credit to the system for its ability to adapt to the current battlefield and receive system 
upgrades or new sensors, which has always been the cornerstone of its existence. The 
TRSS Technical Manual (TM) states: 
The Tactical Remote Sensor Systems System of Systems (TRSS SoS) is a 
system-of-systems program to provide unattended sensors, retransmission 
systems, and sensor monitoring systems. TRSS are deployed and operated 
by Ground Sensor Platoons (GSPs) in support of the Commander’s 
intelligence collection effort. Once deployed, the remote systems operate 
autonomously to provide continuous, unattended surveillance of distant 
areas of the battle space. TRSS are frequently employed to provide 
surveillance and reconnaissance in places where it is too dangerous to 
maintain personnel or not tactically practical to deploy other surveillance 
systems. Remote sensors use multiple sensing modalities and radio 
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communications methods to detect and report personnel and vehicle 
activity in designated areas of interest. All sensors are passive; detection is 
accomplished when target-generated energy is sensed. [18] 
 This quote stresses several key points addressed in previous chapters, such as the 
marriage between TRSS and the GSPs, that TRSS is flexible, and that it has the unique 
capability to conduct reconnaissance missions in areas other assets cannot. Figure 16 
shows an example of TRSS employment in a complex diverse environment for advanced 
intelligence collections.   
 
Figure 16.  TRSS Theater of Operations, from [18] 
This figure depicts the use of TRSS equipment in urban and rural non-permissive 
areas, tracking the movement of personnel and tracked vehicles, relaying signals through 
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multiple frequencies, with a Sensor Monitoring Group (SMG) established on a naval ship 
at a secure location.   
a. Equipment Specifications 
TRSS contains several different types of UGS in different shapes and sizes to aid 
in overall adaptability. The sensors include the Encoder Transmit Unit Version II (ETU-
II), which is the Seismic and Acoustic (SA) UGS for the TRSS, as well as the 
communications device for all of the TRSS equipment except the imagers [18]. The 
Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MAGID) is the magnetic UGS for the TRSS, and the 
Infrared Intrusion Detector Version II (IRID-II) is the IR UGS for the TRSS [18]. The 
UGS communications signals can be relayed via the Radio Relay (RR) device, as shown 
in Figure 16, which allows for maximum concealment of the UGS near the objective 
area, and the emplacement of larger yet more powerful communications device in the RR 
to be emplaced further away in a more safe or concealable area [18]. The UGS data set 
terminates at the SMG, which is a computer system that receives and monitors all UGS 
data sets [18]. For the Marines in the field, the Hand Held Programmer Monitor (HHPM) 
allows them the ability to configure the UGS, sight in the imagers, and monitor UGS 
collections information from the field [18]. Figure 17 shows these different types of UGS 




Figure 17.  TRSS UGS Operational Configuration, from [18] 
The battery box provides an added option for extended life for the UGS, should 
the tactical situation permit [18]. The geophone is the seismic spike that requires burying 
for proper functioning [18]. All these UGS and supporting equipment are capable of 
being buried for concealment and operations [18]. The UGS antennas, acoustic 
microphone on the ETU-II and the IRID-II lens are the only components that must 
remain exposed [18].   
The TRSS has both a short-range imager and a long-range imager, as seen in 









Figure 18.  TRSS Imagers Operational Configuration, from [18] 
These imagers are capable of operating in a variety of areas, taking still imagery 
but not full motion video, and being programmed to allow for cuing by the ETU-II [18]. 
This is a good combination of different detection capabilities that results in a creation of 
an image anytime the other UGS are activated, which allows the imager to go to sleep 
until cued to take a picture, thus saving battery life.   
 TRSS can communicate over both Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High 
Frequency (UHF) channels, the latter including both line-of-sight and satellite links to aid 
in overall versatility for employment [18]. However, data transfer rates are limited to no 
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more than 9600 bits per second (bps). Figure 19 depicts the TRSS communications 
capabilities while Table 6 provides the specific frequency ranges supported. 
 
Figure 19.  TRSS Device Communications Programing, from [18] 
Table 6.   TRSS Operating Frequency Range, from [18] 
 
 
This extent of communications capability, coupled with state-of-the-art 
technology, provides TRSS the ability to support a variety of surveillance missions in 
multiple environments for optimal efficiency in intelligence collections. 
b. Employment 
TRSS offers a variety of employment opportunities for intelligence collections 
missions despite being designed as cueing devices, which means as they collect data sets, 
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the personnel doing the monitoring of this data set must determine suspicious information 
through pattern analysis and situational awareness. This data set would then lead to the 
monitoring unit sending in another asset to investigate, such as a patrol from a friendly 
unit or a UAS to remain in a stealth role. TRSS is a durable and reliable system capable 
of advanced SA, IR, magnetic, and imagery intelligence collections. Figure 20  accurately 
depicts the communications scheme for employment, which significantly highlights the 
numerous possibilities for the UGS to talk to each other. 
 
Figure 20.  TRSS Sample Network, from [18] 
Key factors associated with the employment capabilities of the TRSS are the 
weight, size, detection ranges, and battery life of the UGS. Table 7 shows the detection 
ranges, based on certain conditions and targets.   
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Table 7.   TRSS Sensor Directory, from [18] 
 
 
To clarify Table 7, “low, medium, and high” refer to the detection ranges for the 
TRSS UGS based on severely restrictive, restrictive, and non-restricted military doctrinal 
terrain classifications. Example being a dense urban area would be severely restricted 
terrain, which would result in low detections ranges, whereas the desert would be non-
restrictive terrain, which would result in high detection ranges. The “unknown” sensor 
detection criteria is a manufactures note, stating that not all detections will be classified, 
and that this can occur at all ranges and conditions for all UGS based on the situation.   
c. Summary 
TRSS is a versatile system with unique and advanced capabilities that is rugged 
and user-friendly. TRSS has had a strong reputation of success over the past few years, 
adjusting to support a multitude of missions. The ability to use both long and short-range 
imagers provides an increased ability to conceal smaller devices closer to the objective, 
while maintaining a collections capability with greater standoff for the long-range 
imager. Additionally, having each of the UGS separate, or single UGS in single node vs 
multiple UGS in one node, allows for specific user configuration as well as selective 
maintenance, for if one of the UGS is bad the others are not affected and the system is 
still operational. TRSS UGS contain a tamper feature; if hostile forces or civilians 
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recover the UGS, the UGS can send a signal to the SMG and the UGS then zeroes out all 
stored data sets, rendering it null until it is recovered and reprogrammed.   
Over the past ten years, upgrades to the TRSS communications capabilities and 
added imagers have aided in the UGS increased flexibility to support a variety of tactical 
operations. Certain UGS seem bulky and heavy at times, but overall they are adaptable 
and reliable.   
There are some operational limitations to the TRSS. Currently, it has no Air 
Delivery (AD) capability. It has no radar sensor capability. It lacks the ability to integrate 
with digital Common Operational Picture (COP) systems. Further, it lacks a capability for 
remote offsite configuration from the SMG.   
2. McQ Overview 
One of the leading COTS UGS companies is McQ, based in Stafford, Virginia. 
McQ developed the OmniSense UGS, a multi-sensor encased node that was SATCOM 
capable and used during OIF starting in 2004. McQ is well known for using state-of-the-
art technology, and, in the more recent years, has focused on designing UGS to be 
rugged, unique, yet small and light. McQ defines their UGS with the following 
characteristics:   
Technical Attributes: 
 Very low power sensors that provide long endurance operations with small 
battery supplies. 
 An advanced digital architecture designed around a modular approach for 
working with different sensors and providing a flexible set of features. 
 Integrated communications that allow digital wireless RF communications 
from each sensor interfaced into a variety of network architectures to relay 
critical data to a final destination for analysis and alarm readout. 
 Advanced digital sensor processing combining algorithmic, 
time/frequency domain transforms, and decision logic to make informed 
decisions based on signal features. 
 Mechanical designs that permit airdropping sensors with or without 
parachutes. 
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 Advanced image processing and data fusion with multi spectral sensors 
providing computer driven Situation Awareness. [19] 
Like TRSS, McQ UGS can use VHF, UHF, or SATCOM; however, unlike TRSS 
they possess a unique WiFi capability as well. All McQ UGS use the TNet for 
communications, which is their own specific network system of repeaters and a base 
station, as displayed in Figure 21.   
 
Figure 21.  McQ UGS Network, from [6] 
Similar to TRSS, McQ UGS are proven to be rugged, flexible, and adaptable to a 
multitude of mission sets, which is clearly seen in their extensive DOD, Department of 
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and civilian security company customer 
listing. The programming and monitoring of McQ UGS at the employment site is through 
an android smart phone, which is much lighter, smaller, and user friendly than the TRSS 
HHPM. Once emplaced, McQ UGS show GPS location for monitoring and tracking. All 
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McQ UGS can be configured independently onsite via the android smartphone or offsite 
via a laptop and TNet communications components from the monitoring site. These UGS 
do not require burying for proper functioning, unlike the ETU-II in TRSS, which must be 
buried for the seismic UGS to function. All McQ UGS can autonomously interface with a 
digital COP system for digital battle tracking. 
a. Equipment Specifications 
Although the OmniSense UGS are no longer being used, McQ has developed the 
iScout, an encased SA, IR, and magnetic UGS much smaller, lighter, durable, and 
reliable that the OmniSense. With several UGS in one unit, the iScout offers a unique 
capability in one node, does not require burying, and has several battery options 
including 1.5 Volt AAs, and add-on battery box for extended life through military grade 
BA 5590 batteries, or a solar panel, as seen in Figure 22.   
 
Figure 22.  iScout Image, from [20] 
Additional advertised characteristics include:  
 Built in global positioning satellite (GPS) receiver. 
 14-day life/external battery for longer life- 3 months, 1 year, & indefinite 
solar unit. 
 Built in tamper. 
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 Size: 3 ½ x 3 ½ x 1 ¾ inches. 
 Wireless RF networked communications. 
 Built in seismic, acoustic, magnetic, and PIR sensors-optional switch 
closure/tripwire. 
 Two AA batteries (lithium preferred). 
 Solar and extended life power available. 
 Weight: 8 ounces. 
 Rugged, waterproof case. 
 Classification: seismic people, seismic vehicle, acoustic speech. 
 Operating Temperature: 40 to + 60ºC. [20] 
The iScout is lighter and smaller than the TRSS ETU-II or MAGID, as displayed 
with the size comparison seen in Figure 23.   
   
Figure 23.  iScout Size Image, from [20] 
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Similar to the TRSS ETU-IIs, IRID, and MAGID being able to cue the imagers, 
the iScout is able to cue the McQ OmniWatch to activate. The iScout target classification 
includes people and vehicles, but is unable to distinguish between wheeled and tracked 
vehicles, as TRSS is able to do.    
McQ is the leading developer of a ground Radio Frequency (RF) based UGS, or 
ground radar system, known as the rScene. This UGS is capable of detecting the 
movement of vehicles and personnel through foliage, in dense urban areas, high traffic 
areas, marshy areas, and across water. McQ advertises the rScene’s characteristics as:  
 Very small 5 x 5 x 2 inch RF sensor unit, 4 x 6 ¾ x 7 ½ battery case. 
 Weight: RF sensor unit 1 lbs., battery case with BA-5390 4.5 lbs. 
 Automated target detection and classification; multiple targets can be 
displayed; tamper alarm if unit is moved. 
 Detects and classifies people up to 100 meters and vehicles up to 300 
meters. 
 Can see through foliage and camouflage. 
 Very low false alarm rate; wind, rain, and foliage movement do not cause 
false alarms. 
 Long operational life up to 2 weeks on battery, solar power controller built 
in. 
 RF wireless network communications. 
 Meta data includes GPS location; compass pointing angle; target location, 
speed, and direction. [21] 
Not only is the rScene unique in its method of collections, it is rugged, light, and 
small as seen in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24.  rScene Size Image, from [21] 
The digital battle tracking for the rScene shows the type of target within the UGS 
range fan with the targets direction of movement overlaid on top of digital imagery, as 
displayed in Figure 25.   
 
Figure 25.  rScene Digital Tracking Projection, from [21] 
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The OmniWatch is the McQ imaging unit, capable of both color still imagery and 
FMV, as opposed to the TRSS imagers that just do black and white still imagery. 
Additionally, McQ advertises the following:   
Features: Battery Operated Surveillance; Map Based User Display; 
Wireless Communications; Video Storage and Replay; Day and Night 
Cameras; User Interface System Control; 30 Day Persistent Surveillance; 
User Interface Map Display; 10 lbs. Deployed Kit Weight with Battery; 
Video on Smart Phones and Tablets; iScout® Seismic, Magnetic, 
Acoustic, and Passive IR Triggering Sensors; rScene® Triggering 
Sensor[6]. 
Upon request, the OmniWatch can be equipped with a TPZ feature that allows for 
remote offsite independent adjustment of the camera view and angles for better image 
collections. The OmniWatch imagers are similar in size, shape, and weight to those of the 
TRSS imagers, yet their connected communications transmitter is smaller and lighter, 
which is displayed in Figure 26.   
  
Figure 26.  OmniWatch Image, from [6] 
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Although not advertised, the OmniWatch has been proven to detect personnel 
targets at a range of 3000 m, which is three times that of the maximum range for the 
TRSS long-range imagers [6].   
b. Employment 
Employment of the McQ UGS is similar to that of the TRSS, as seen previously 
in Figure 21. The OmniWatch must communicate with other UGS and repeaters, the 
repeaters must communicate with others to relay their signals, and these signals are 
relayed to a base station for digital monitoring.   
There are several key employment factors unique to the McQ UGS that allow for 
increased flexibility in mission support. All the McQ UGS and associated components, to 
include solar panels, can be covered up for concealment. They also come equipped with 
fake rocks and branches (other parts of natural or manmade terrain available upon 
request) for concealment. All McQ UGS are capable of utilizing solar power technology, 
which can extend the life of an UGS past 90 days in the field. McQ offers an AD 
capability for the iScout UGS, dropped out of fixed or rotary wing aircraft for 
employment. The use of RF UGS in the rScene is a unique detection method for 
intelligence collections offers a significant employment capability in dense terrain or 
amphibious environments. McQ uses their proprietary Terrestrial Network (TNet) for 
UGS communications, which is an autonomous, low power, RF-based, mesh network 
capable of overcoming terrain obstacles or obstructions [22]. Additional characteristics of 
the TNet include: 
 Sensor information relay easily set up in the field. 
 Self-forming and self-healing mesh ad hoc network. 
 Automatic recognition and reporting of neighbor sensors or repeater units. 
 Guaranteed delivery of messages. 
 Very low power consumption with solar recharging options. 
 Long RF link distances with multiple repeater architecture. 
 Very fast delivery of target alarms and images. 
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 Internet protocol network connectivity. 
 Outdoor rugged environment and rack mount units. [22] 
The TNet allows for various communications methods and ranges capable of 
fusion for optimal employment and range in using the McQ UGS. It is encryption capable 
and has an internal solar power charger for the repeaters to aid in extended battery life. 
Also related to communications is the cellular communications capability offered by the 
vWatch for McQ [23]. This system allows for the establishment of an independent 
cellular communications structure to be established for long-range communications. This 
communications system is new, encrypted, based on state of the art cell phone 
technology, and highly reliable. For networking, McQ uses the Open Standards for 
Unattended Sensors Data Protocol for broadband and narrowband communications, 
allowing for a streamlined interface between the field devices, central servers, and user 
interfaces all through Internet protocol networks [23]. This allows for standard viewing 
of UGS collections data sets on multiple approved systems.   
c. Summary 
McQ UGS are very similar in type and employment to that of the TRSS. 
Although they are used for many other missions than those that would be supporting 
intelligence collections, given the operational demands of EF 21, McQ UGS could 
greatly augment the already existing TRSS capability. For employment, having a RF 
UGS such as the rScene is a welcomed addition and new capability. The FMV capability 
and range of the OmniWatch would bolster the existing TRSS imagers. A 
communications network system such as the TNet aids in command and control of the 
UGS to a degree unmatched by TRSS. In addition, the AD, remote base station 
independent configuring, use of an Android smartphone for onsite monitoring and 
configuration, and digital COP system interface are desired capabilities for the TRSS.    
3. DARPA ADAPT Overview 
These UGS possess several unique capabilities found in their single encased node 
that contains multiple sensors for standardized employment. The UGS v2, the final node 
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prototype developed under the ADAPT program, contains three passive IR sensors, two 
cameras (EO or IR capable) for images or FMV, a magnetic sensor, and a seismic 
acoustic sensor. Additionally, ADAPT has an RF or radar sensor to be emplaced in the 
node as needed. ADAPT is capable of communicating through the UHF and VHF 
spectrums, as well as through WiFi. The nodes are self-contained, as shown in Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27.  ADAPT Node Configuration, from [24] 
This system is designed to create a meshed network interconnecting the nodes 
autonomously, while also establishing a reach-back link to communicate with the 
monitoring station. The objective of this programs states,  
The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that a significant break 
from current practice is required to rapidly develop low-cost intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensor systems. The ADAPT 
program seeks to deliver this breakthrough by adapting manufacturing 
approaches traditionally employed in commercial technology and by 
developing/ implementing novel development techniques/processes. [25] 
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This objective outlines the ADAPTs innovation and potential, which drives UGS 
advancements in a new productive direction. Additional characteristics include:  
 Smaller, more compact design (3.2x3.6x1.6-in; 345 g). 
 Integrated ridge (analogous to a gun sight) that allows precise alignment 
of passive infrared (PIR) sensors and cameras. 
 Extensible skinning concept to supply an irregular profile and facilitate 
camouflage. 
 Quick response code label on bottom of case that provides software unit 
identification and android debug bridge serial number. 
 Three narrow-beam PIR sensors spaced equally around outside (i.e., 
120°), tilted slightly up to aim at ranges between 1–20 range, and capable 
of reporting movement as left-to right or right-to-left (v. just on/off). 
 Two standard flash cameras. 
 Audio input channel. 
 Screw thread on bottom of case allowing an optional spike to improve 
seismic sensing. 
 Vertical single-axis geophone connected mechanically to optional spike. 
 Tripwire capable is using an externally accessible switch sensor to which a 
tripwire can be attached using a magnet. 
 Two externally accessible terminals for software-controlled switched 
output power. 
 Report of unit orientation. 
 Externally accessible standard micro-universal serial bus connector that 
provides a data interface to the ADAPT core. 
 Rechargeable 10.4 Ah battery that is field swappable without special tools 
 Weather and water resistance. 
 Speaker that can broadcast audible alarms for deployment and/or testing 
(e.g., unit booting). 
 Simple, externally accessible on/off switch. [25] 
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The ADAPT was first designed as non-lethal mines in addition to surveillance 
assets, and has since then evolved to meet the original requirements as well as hosting 
new capabilities.   
a. Equipment Specifications 
Unique to ADAPT along with the single encased node, is the Passive IR (PIR) 
synchronization capability, as shown in Figure 28.   
  
Figure 28.  ADAPT Network Connectivity Image, after [25] 
This capability allows the UGS to become linked to each other in a Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN), which requires the PIR sensors to be on and form an invisible 
tripwire system with other nodes. Once a tripwire is broken, it will then cue the cameras 
to activate, as well as wake up the nodes nearest to the activating ones so they become 
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alert for collections. Additionally, when the WSN is established the other sensors can be 
programmed to go to sleep, thus preserving the battery life of the nodes.   
Other features common to all the ADAPT nodes is a rechargeable lithium battery, 
an offsite remote configuration capability, multi-sensor cuing for the cameras, digital 
COP systems interface, signal relay ability with repeaters, and an AD capability. The 
circuitry in the ADAPT nodes is based on modern day cell phone technology, which 
allows for a variety of channels and components to be used, as seen in Figure 29, as well 
as the previously discussed sensor types and dimensions.   
 
Figure 29.  ADAPT Capabilities Diagram, from [24] 
The WiFi communication network is newly advanced and once established, very 
reliable. However, WiFi is very susceptible to Electronic Warfare (EW) jamming; should 
this method of communication be employed, it would best occur when the enemy has a 
weak signals intelligence or EW capability. Unlike TRSS or McQ’s OmniWatch, 
ADAPT has neither long-range imager capability nor an onsite portable configuration 
device like the TRSS HHPM. 
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b. Employment 
ADAPT UGS offer a unique employment capability based on standardized form-
factor encased nodes and the WSN link for joint sensor detections. These UGS can be 
emplaced much faster than the TRSS UGS, and in a similar fashion to the McQ iScout, 
just turn them on and drop them. Without the seismic spike, the ADAPT nodes can be air 
delivered. They are designed for employment as a family or with several UGS at the 
same time linked to each other, similar to TRSS with sensor strings of 3–5 UGSs, 
creating redundancy for increased chances of success. In addition, the sensors have 
specific ranges and angles of detection as show in Figure 30.   
 
Figure 30.  ADAPT Ranges, from [24] 
For concealment purposes, the ADAPT UGS can be buried, covered with foliage, 
fitted for fake rocks, painted, or sprayed with adhesive allowing the terrain to stick to the 
node, as long as the PIR and camera sensors are exposed. The activation display, similar 
to the picture in Figure 30, will display the UGS GPS location, camera pictures, and the 
node’s battery life.   
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c. Summary 
The ADAPT offers a different yet dynamic approach to sensor employment with 
modern cell phone technology. Due to the small size of the nodes, the sensors have 
limited detections ranges, however their reliability and battery life match those of the 
other UGS. Creating a standard case with unique nodes able to be configured based on 
the mission parameters, along with a rechargeable battery, greatly aid in overall 
flexibility for employment. The speed of employment, WSN capability, size and weight 
of the nodes and use of current cell phone technology make this system an amazing 
intelligence collections asset with the potential to upgrade the USMC’s existing UGS 
capability. However, as the status is that of prototype artifacts, a full-fledged production 
program would need to be initiated to bring the capability to the fleet. 
D. UGS EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS 
The primary advantage of TRSS is that it has maintained a lasting relationship 
with USMC, which shows reliability and trust. TRSS has proven to work for Marines in 
combat operations and amphibious operations, all existing through various harsh 
environments over several decades. It has always been capable of establishing near real 
time NRT reporting and, unlike ADAPT, it has both short and long-range imagers   
However, several disadvantages exist with TRSS, one being that it is bulky and heavy as 
compared to ADAPT or McQ. Further, TRSS has no alternate power source such as solar 
or rechargeable batteries. TRSS imagers have a limited range when compared to those of 
McQ. They also lack FMV, TPZ, and color imaging capabilities. There is no digital COP 
interface, no remote autonomous configuration from the SMG, and instead of an android 
smartphone for onsite configuration, it has the bulky HHPM, which lacks a touch screen 
capability. TRSS lacks radar UGS, AD capability, and any alternate form of 
communications beyond VHF, UHF, and SATCOM. The ETU-II requires burying for 
proper functioning, which adds employment considerations for time on the objective and 
concealment. TRSS has no GPS integration and it has no casing ability, so each of the 
different sensors is separate.   
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McQ offers state of the art technology, flexibility, and a well-established 
reputation with customers such as Department of Justice, SOF, and other DOD units. 
Their imagers are TPZ, FMV, and color capable. Using the proprietary TNet for data 
communications, McQ has faster data transfer rates than TRSS and incorporates advance 
data encryption software. It supports a digital COP interface, includes a cellular 
communications option, and an interface for an android smartphone for onsite 
programing. McQ has an AD capability and extended battery options, to include solar 
panels. Finally, it supports radar UGS in the rScene form factor,   
ADAPT is small, light, and easy to employ, while remaining flexible with a radar 
UGS, WSN for node-to-node communication, and WiFi for an alternate means of 
communications [12]. These UGS use current relevant cell phone technology in a unique 
yet simple concept. ADAPT requires no onsite programming and has a digital COP 
interface capability. Constraints include limited UGS detections ranges, no long-range 
imagers, limited testing, and lack of existing robust production capability.     
Table 8 is derived from a detailed analysis of the different UGS systems’ 
capabilities and several other factors that aid in flexibility for UGS employment missions 
supporting EF 21 intelligence collections.   
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Seismic with Acoustic 10-50m 10-50m 20m
IR 20-50m 10-50m 20m
Magnetic 4-25m 10m 10m
Short Range EO/IR Imager 150-500m 200-500m 20m
Long Range EO/IR Imager 450-1000m 1000-2000m N/A
Radar N/A 100-300m 10m
Seismic with Acoustic 3 Integrated Integrated
IR 0.8 Integrated Integrated
Magnetic 1 Integrated Integrated
Short Range EO/IR Imager 10 10 Integrated
Long Range EO/IR Imager 12 10 N/A
Radar N/A 1 Integrated
Overall Node N/A iScout = 0.7 0.8
VHF Yes Yes No
UHF Yes Yes Yes
Satcom Yes Yes Yes
Other N/A Cellular WiFi
Relay / Repeater Capable Yes Yes Yes
Burying Required Yes No No
Tripwire Attachment No Yes Yes
Imagers TPZ Capable No Yes No
Imagers FMV Capable No Yes Yes
Digital COP Interface No Yes Yes
Casing Ability No Yes, iScout Yes
Battery Life 30-60 days 14-90 days 14 days
Battery Type





Extended Battery Life Option 90-180 days 90-180 days N/A
Additional Battery Options N/A Solar Rechargeable




Near Real Time Reporting Yes Yes Yes








This table reflects a summation of four major areas for analysis when factoring in 
the UGS ability to support intelligence collections missions in non-permissive 
environments under conditions of distress, such as those described in EF 21. Although 
TRSS and McQ are very similar in sensor range comparison, McQ pulls ahead with their 
long-range imagers and radar UGS. Sensor weight is usually a moot point based on 
quantity of UGS and batteries carried; however, lighter is always better, and in this 
comparison ADAPT wins. For the communications comparison, McQ offers a unique 
capability in cellular as does ADAPT with WiFi, both aid in mission flexibility and 
enhance the UGS ability for employment. The other unique factors compared on this 
table offer great insight as to the UGS flexibility, leaving McQ as the better choice based 
on systems integration, communications capability, and imager capability. It is the only 
UGS system to offer imagers to view targets at a range greater than 1000 meters, plus a 
tilt-pan-zoom capability and full motion video. ADAPT and McQ have several 
similarities in the digital COP interface, autonomous configuration, AD, radar UGS, GPS 
integration, no burying requirement, FMV imagers, and an alternate means of 
communications. All these areas are fields that these two systems currently possess, 
where the TRSS vendor is continuing to research, design, or implement such capabilities 
leaving it at a severe disadvantage [26].   
E. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the units and technologies associated with UGS in the USMC 
fosters great optimism for adjustments and advancements in a field that yearns for and 
rates upgrades not only to support intelligence collections operations for EF 21, but also 
to better support the Marines as a whole. The reconnaissance battalions and intelligence 
battalions are both successful establishments with talented Marines, the unit base research 
shows that when it comes to the employment of UGS the Surveillance Sensor Operators 
have the technical skill but lack the field craft and endurance of the reconnaissance 
specialists. TRSS has a long established role with the USMC, however McQ UGS and 
ADAPT are advanced in areas that TRSS cannot match and by the time it does, it will 
likely continue to be behind due to current technological advancement rates. Modification 
of the GSPs tables of organization and tables of equipment as well as the TRSS program 
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of record must be done to advance the role of UGS in the USMC and to increase the 
potential of the USMC organic intelligence collections assets as a whole. Based on the 
analysis in this chapter, in addition to the literature analysis of Chapter II, Chapter IV 
provides fusion of this information using a systems engineering approach to revitalize 
UGS in the USMC.  
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IV. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the information collected from analysis of 
the respective literature in Chapter II and research in Chapter III to the systems 
engineering (SE) process for the development of new solutions. The perspective of this 
chapter is that of a program manager tasked with evaluating and improving the use of 
UGS in the USMC to support EF 21. The use of SE concepts and designs gives structure 
to evaluating and assessing the system and all the associated components. Using this 
process aids in determining new and innovative ways to employ, train with, and test 
UGS.  
The main reference used for this process is Systems Engineering Management by 
Benjamin S. Blanchard. The method utilized is to apply a select and modified SE 
approach, mainly the SE major elements and design requirements, to a standard format 
for the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) construct [27]. Not all portions required the same amount of research or 
modifying, some contain overlapping issues, but all rate addressing to add structure and 
validity to the overall process. Using this process for revamping UGS in the USMC for 
EF 21, plus the proposal of a new table of organization (Figure 34), some conceptual 
overlaps in the areas of organization, training, leadership and personnel now exist. The 
result of this chapter is recommendations for improvements in UGS as a system for the 
USMC to support the new increased demands brought about in EF 21.   
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN 
To properly format a plan for UGS in the SE design construct the definition of a 
SE process must become clear. A system, defined by military standards is 
a composite of equipment, skills, and techniques capable of performing 
and/or supporting an operational role. A complete system includes all 
equipment, related facilities, material, software, services, and personnel 
required for its operation and support to the degree that it can be 
considered a self-sufficient unit in its intended environment. [27] 
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 Relative to UGS for the USMC, the DOTMLPF format will provide sufficient 
context for evaluation of the system, based on this definition. Figure 31 is from 
Blanchard’s System Engineering Management 4th ed. 2008, from which it gives graphic 
detail to the previously stated definition.     
 
Figure 31.  Major Elements of a System, from [27] 
Analysis of these major elements of a system applied to UGS for the USMC poses 
a credible set of topics for evaluation and possible future development. In the evaluation 
of a system, understanding the system design elements, the current environment for the 
design, and the design requirements are the key focus areas for a detailed evaluation. 
Figure 32 is from Blanchard’s System Engineering Management 4th ed. 2008, and it 




Figure 32.  System Design Requirements, from [27] 
Not all the elements from Figure 32 are researchable in each section of the 
DOTMLPF for UGS in the USMC; however, all are crucial to certain aspects of the SE 
process in their own right.   
B. DOCTRINE   
As discussed in Chapter II, this is an area in much need of refinement relative to 
the role of UGS in the USMC and the employing unit. With the Remote Ground Sensors 
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publication being dated and inaccurate, the MAGTF Intelligence Collection publication 
containing conflicting information, and the Ground Reconnaissance publication still in 
draft form yet leading the path for the previous two to be refined, UGS doctrine must 
become clarified and modernized to support EF 21 intelligence collections missions. 
Following the SE approach, the key system elements relative to improvements in UGS 
doctrine are the operating equipment, and operational concept elements [27]. The most 
important SE design requirements for UGS doctrine are those pertinent to reliability and 
supportability [27]. 
The Remote Ground Sensors publication discusses several key elements; 
however, it needs updates, which fosters little confidence in a reader that is inexperienced 
with UGS and trying to learn. The technical UGS aspects need removing from the 
doctrine and should remain solely in the technical manuals, allowing the doctrine to stay 
consistent even as technology changes. This may be a controversial concept, but over the 
years as UGS have improved, they have become smaller, lighter, gained longer lasting 
batteries, and imagers. However, the majority of the senor types have stayed the same, 
with consistent ranges such as the magnetic and IR. If the technical details are in the 
doctrinal publications then the doctrine will never be current, which is why the concepts 
need to be in the doctrine and the specifications in the TMs. The information/data relative 
to the users of UGS and the reporting of UGS needs to be refined for commonality at all 
levels for the MAGTF. The operational concept elements are those in the doctrine that 
directly affect the warfighter, such as roles and responsibilities, ownership of equipment, 
reporting requirements, planning cycles such as Figure 4 and Figure 8, and employment 
techniques. All three of the UGS-related publications touch on these areas; again, 
upgrades are required based on recent combat deployment after action reports and 
commonality between the publications in these areas.     
Creating new UGS doctrine or updating existing doctrine necessitates referencing 
of sound tactics and current structure, which demands reliability. Historic after action 
reports from combat operations will provide great rationale to drive modifications of 
UGS doctrine, which will add great clarity to the missions and environments UGS can 
support. The doctrine must be supportable, which means the Remote Ground Sensors, 
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MAGTF Intelligence Collection, and Ground Reconnaissance publications will need 
modifications in the same areas, mainly roles and responsibilities, command and control, 
units, and the employment of UGS.    
C. ORGANIZATIONS 
Currently all of the USMC’s UGS fall under the ownership of the GSPs, which 
are subordinate to the BSCs of the intelligence battalions. However, as explained in 
Chapter III, the reconnaissance battalions also have tasks to employ UGS, creating 
redundancy in the two units. The GSP’s design is to support all MEF operations, to 
include task-organized forces, to serve in direct or general support of the MAGTFs or 
other elements as needed. The intelligence battalions are capable of conducting first and 
second echelon maintenance on all UGS at their locations; for third echelon maintenance, 
the UGS receive processing through the unit supply system back through 
MARCORSYSCOM for specific vendor support. If roles and responsibilities are to 
change for the ownership and maintenance of UGS then this methodology will require 
modifications as well. Using the SE process for analysis, the key system elements for 
organizations using UGS in the USMC are the operating and maintenance personnel [27]. 
The most essential SE design requirements relative to the GSP organization are the 
design for flexibility, design for availability, and the design for the environment [27]. 
Figure 33 shows the current 1
st




Figure 33.  Current 1st GSP Table of Organization, after [14] 
The intelligence battalions own all the operating personnel based on its technical 
and tactical proficiencies as well as its ability to support the MEF. However, the GSPs 
still lack the ability to support EF 21-like missions with a SPIE capability and advanced 
ground reconnaissance skills. Figure 34 depicts the author’s proposed GSP table of 
organization, enhanced to support EF 21.   
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Figure 34.  GSP (EF 21) Table of Organization, after [14] 
The SESs and three of the SETs are deleted from the existing structure and their 
personnel are absorbed into the remaining six SETs, which are bolstered with more 
personnel and Reconnaissance Man (Parachute and Combat Diver Qualified) MOS 0326 
Staff Sergeants (SSgts) as Team Leaders. Currently, few existing missions require an 
SES for support. This new structure allows the SET to be the lowest level maneuver 
element, with a larger and more diverse HQ Team to handle the traditional roles such as  
command and control and logistics, as well as support new functions such as to provide 
liaison elements and intelligence support for advanced UGS operations in non-permissive 
environments, as discussed in EF 21. Although the TRSS Technicians are organic to the 
system support platoons for the intelligence battalions, the GSP (EF 21) model allows 
four UGS Technicians to be at the GSP, based on new technologies to support those 
units. This change exists to support the unit as needed onsite and to be able to fix more 
issues at the lowest level before reaching out to the battalion for maintenance support. 
 78 
Flexibility is a Marine tenant, part of USMC history and long standing ethos, 
which in turn serves as a pillar to intelligence collections for EF 21. UGS aid in 
providing commanders flexibility in intelligence collections and maneuver, which when 
merged with ground reconnaissance units can significantly expand their capabilities. 
Currently, the GSPs are task-organized to support MAGTFs of all sizes, anytime, and in 
any place, which reinforces the concept of flexibility. An organization of this kind must 
be available for tasking to support the demands of the USMC and to perform no matter 
what or where the mission.  
The GSPs are capable of completing most of these available tasks, however as EF 
21 grows and becomes second nature, necessary modifications to the organizational 
construct now present themselves. The GSP (EF 21) table of organization allows the 
SETs to be more flexible and capable of supporting maneuver and intelligence collections 
missions, based on their increased size and new MOS structure.   
Combat operations over the past ten years have placed Marines in some extremely 
difficult environments against tough, complex foes. Units must be capable of working in 
all environments, especially with UGS. In addition, if the demand signal increases for the 
employment of UGS in non-permissive environments for the USMC general purpose 
forces, this new table of organization places Marines at the GSP with SPIE skills, as well 
as advanced ground reconnaissance and field craft skills, now able to train the rest of the 
platoon for UGS missions in non-permissive environments. The new reconnaissance SSgt 
Team Leader would be capable of attaching to a reconnaissance team to conduct SPIE for 
the employment of UGS in support of intelligence collections operations for EF 21. To 
recap key concepts from Chapter III, a doctrinal reconnaissance element’s primary tasks 
are to gain access to the battlefield, support maneuver operations as a maneuver element 
or through intelligence collections, and provide vital information to targeting efforts [3]. 
SET Leaders with ground reconnaissance experience as well as now an added UGS 
employment capability, fused with the reconnaissance team will greatly increases their 
chances for success, reduce overall risk, and provide longer advance ground surveillance 
in support of EF 21 missions unlike anything the MAGTFs have done before.  
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D. TRAINING  
With the new GSP (EF 21) table of organization, additional training and readiness 
events are required for the Surveillance Sensor Operators to support advance ground 
reconnaissance events and SPIE, referencing the reconnaissance MOS training and 
readiness manual for compatibility and structuring. The SPIE training events will be for 
the reconnaissance SSgts in the GSP, for they would come to the GSPs already capable in 
all the USMC aspects of SPIE, just requiring sustainment training. This would allow the 
GSPs more training time at their base stations and not require additional schools for the 
other Surveillance Sensor Operators, which would be time away from home and mission 
specific training. The result would be a reconnaissance SSgt able to detach from the SET 
and attach to a reconnaissance team to support them with UGS, as in Chapter I, Figure 3. 
In addition, the SET as a whole is now more capable with the implementation of the GSP 
(EF 21) table of organization, with this comes the increased requirement for advanced 
training for more complex missions possibly require SPIE techniques. The key system 
elements related to training for UGS in the USMC are the transportation and handling of 
equipment and operator training [27]. The most important SE design requirements for 
training to EF 21 standards relative to the employment of UGS for the USMC are in the 
design for quality and testability [27]. 
The transportation and handling of equipment for UGS in the USMC is a key 
issue relative to training because the movement and employment of UGS is in direct 
relation to the size, shape, weight, and durability of the UGS. The smaller the UGS the 
greater the ease in transporting, as well as the greater the quantities that can be carried by 
an individual Marine, which effects overall mobility and the training standards associated 
with it. This is essential for EF 21 missions that require SPIE methods or dismounted 
movements through rough terrain because increased weight could result in increased risk. 
Inadequate training could lead to improper employment; improper employment of an 
UGS string can be the difference between a successful mission over months and a 
compromised mission in a matter of hours.   
Currently, the Surveillance Sensor Operators receive training from formal 
schools, MEU work ups and deployments, and real world missions, as well as platoon-
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level training supervised by the intelligence battalions. All of these training opportunities 
focus on conducting operations in a semi-permissive environment or possibly in a non-
permissive environment with additional support for security. With the tasks modified to 
support EF 21, enhanced technology sensors training fused with reconnaissance expertise 
foster a relationship for the creation of advanced training plans in the areas of ground 
reconnaissance and SPIE. The addition of reconnaissance SSgts as the Team Leader and 
Operations Chief as per the GSP (EF 21) table of organization, will greatly aid in 
advancing the GSPs overall level of field craft, ground reconnaissance, reporting, and 
planning skills for operations with limited support in non-permissive environments.   
Coordination of SPIE training for the GSPs would require a memorandum of 
agreement between the intelligence battalions and reconnaissance battalions. This would 
allow the SET to receive partnered training with the reconnaissance battalions, since the 
reconnaissance battalions have the majority of the required MEF-level support equipment 
and personnel for SPIE operations. The majority of the training agreement would be so 
the reconnaissance SSgts in the GSPs could stay current on their airborne and dive 
capabilities. These modifications to the current USMC training would support the new 
organic capability, highly versatile, prepared, and able to access the battlefield at any 
point and emplace UGS to provide increased flexibility through technical ground 
surveillance.   
Currently, the highest degree of training and evaluation a MEU can receive is that 
coordinated and evaluated by the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). 
This is an area that requires slight changes, mainly for additional tests to support EF 21-
based training requirements and a mirror image of what they do to support evaluations 
with MAGTF work-ups. EOTG-led training is where SETs receive their greatest testing 
and evaluation in their ability to collect vital intelligence for amphibious assault and raid 
operations. With the GSP (EF 21) table of organization, the evaluation would require 
modification to assess the SETs increased ground reconnaissance capability, SPIE ability 
of the SET, and the Team Leader in an attached role to a reconnaissance team for the 
employment of UGS.   
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Other evaluation areas where training would need modification based on the 
GSPs new design would be for the employment of UGS in the Integrated Training 
Exercise at the MAGTF Training Center at Camp Twenty-nine Palms, California. This 
exercise consists of a six-week desert training package for infantry battalions, focused on 
offensive, defensive, and counter insurgency operations. The evaluators are hand selected 
officers and SNCOs, each a subject matter expert in specific aspects of maneuver 
warfare. The increased use of the GSPs for this training will not only promote 
advertisement and service education for their new capabilities, but also test them in very 
rigorous and demanding environments.   
E. MATERIALS 
UGS require several components and systems for proper functioning because a 
single mission could require a diverse multitude of batteries, cables and connectors, 
radios and relay devices, monitoring equipment, and computers. The technology 
associated with UGS is constantly evolving, as seen with the ADAPT use of cell phone 
technology in Chapter III. This rapid technological growth requires a streamlined plan to 
keep the use of UGS innovative and adaptive to the warfighters’ needs. Using a SE 
approach, TRSS needs a detailed analysis of its current operating and maintenance 
equipment, as well as its requirements for flexibility and maintainability. Relative to the 
existing materials for UGS in the USMC, there is significant room for growth to meet the 
goal of EF 21 intelligence collections missions. The most important system elements 
pertaining to UGS in the USMC fall under the categories of operating and maintenance 
equipment [27]. Significant SE design requirements affecting the materials for UGS in 
the USMC occur in the design for flexibility [27]. 
The operating equipment includes the UGS, the associated employment and 
monitoring components, as well as the communications equipment (radios and 
computers). Commercial companies, as discussed in Chapter III, can produce new 
equipment and capabilities such as ground radars and long-range imagers in a much more 
expedient rate than the USMC with TRSS. The USMC needs to increase its level of 
collaboration with the commercial sector so it can receive new and current UGS in a 
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method that supports placing the most relevant technology and most advanced capability 
in the warfighters’ hands in the most rapid manner. Dissolving TRSS and collaborating 
with a commercial company or companies such as McQ, similar to the other services 
including SOF, would address this concern. The existing capabilities of McQ, as shown 
in Chapter III, provide for a much more flexible, and advanced capability to support the 
needs of EF 21 and enhance the current service level of intelligence collections. 
The maintenance equipment is well organized and well structured, but if the 
USMC acquires more or different UGS from a commercial company, Marines will 
become more reliant on these companies for maintenance support. This is a welcome and 
needed relationship because the commercial sector can track and upgrade the equipment 
at a much faster pace than the DOD. In the short term (three to five years), the 
commercial sector can process and field technological state–of-the-art equipment as soon 
as it is test approved; long-term commitments such as those longer than ten years, 
however, may prose an issue for some of the contracted items. Regardless, planning for 
UGS technologies ten years from the date may be a fool’s errand, since technology is 
advancing at a substantial rate.   
To maintain flexibility, UGS have to be reliable, tested, rugged, user-friendly, and 
capable of performing at any time and in any place. The warfighter requires systems that 
are capable of operating in extreme environments under harsh temperatures, and through 
rough. Additionally, different types of UGS with a variety of communications options 
need fielding to maintain flexibility in mission support. Currently, as seen in Chapter III, 
TRSS has fewer types of sensors and few modes of communications that the other UGS 
discussed, leaving them less flexible to match UGS to the terrain and enemy for 
employment or to configure data transfers for optimal and timely long-range 
communications. USMC partnerships with commercial companies would greatly aid in 
the acquisition of an existing commercial application for a service capability upgrade.     
F. LEADERSHIP 
The current GSP structure calls for one officer and four Staff Non Commissioned 
Officers (SNCOs). The GSP commanders are Ground Intelligence Officers, MOS 0203, 
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with a rank of First Lieutenant (1stLt). They receive three weeks of ground 
reconnaissance planning and two weeks of intelligence collections training at the Ground 
Intelligence Officers Course in addition to continual use of these skills throughout the last 
eight weeks of the twelve-week course. Additionally, the Ground Intelligence Officers 
attend Infantry Officer Course and the Scout Sniper Platoon Commanders Course to hone 
their infantry and surveillance skills. The SNCOs are all Infantry Unit Leader MOS 0369, 
being a Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) for the Operations Chief and three SSgts for the SESs. 
Marines of this rank and stature bring a wealth of experience to the platoon, however they 
lack experience in ground reconnaissance and working in or with small sized elements 
isolated in non-permissive environments. With a focus on leadership development, the 
important system element for the officers and SNCOs is operator-training education [27]. 
Analysis of the leadership area of the DOTMLPF for key SE design requirements leads to 
design for quality and interoperability [27]. 
As per the GSP (EF 21) table of organization, the Platoon Leader rank will 
receive upgrading from 1stLt to Captain, which will allow a more experienced officer to 
be in charge of the platoon, supervising the employment of UGS and networking with 
other units that will receive SETs as enablers. A GSP is more complex than is an infantry 
platoon and has more unique technology than does a scout sniper platoon. In addition, the 
GSPs could have their SETs spread throughout the MEF AO, so the Platoon Leader will 
have to coordinate with several other units to ensure the proper welfare and employment 
of his Marines. All of these factors require a senior company grade officer for leadership. 
The addition of reconnaissance SSgts to the SETs allows the teams to be under the 
leadership of a SNCO, which ensures a more mature ground reconnaissance specialist 
leading a maneuver element ready for attachment to another unit for deployment.   
The quality of leadership the GSPs currently have is just and balanced, however 
the increased demands of EF 21, require an officer and SET Leader rank increase to 
handle the new demands placed on the GSPs. The addition of a Platoon Chief billet for an 
Infantry Unit Leader GySgt and an Operations Chief billet change to a reconnaissance 
SSgt will greatly enhance the leadership of the GSP. These changes aid in allowing the 
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GySgt to be able to focus on the day-to-day platoon events and logistics while allowing 
the reconnaissance SSgt to focus on coordinating training and missions for the unit.   
In order for the GSP leadership to be interoperable, its officer and SNCOs must 
be capable of understanding, planning, and briefing all facets of UGS operations at all 
levels of the MEF. Getting missions and supporting missions is an added benefit that this 
unit has because it does not always deploy as a platoon. For this reason, the SETs are the 
base maneuver element and must maintain the highest possible readiness levels so that 
once a mission is levied upon it the SET is able to accept it. This requires leadership with 
interoperable skills to relate to all levels of the chain of command and to communicate 
effectively throughout those levels. Having a Captain as the Platoon Leader, GySgt as the 
Platoon Chief, and SSgts as Team Leaders will greatly increase the interoperability of the 
GSPs. From networking, to briefing, planning, and tactical on-the-ground leadership, this 
rank increase will greatly aid the GSPs in completing EF 21 intelligence collections 
missions.  
G. PERSONNEL  
Meeting the emerging demands of EF 21 will require significant changes to UGS 
personnel management. Although the GSPs currently support MEU and other operations 
with great success, they have the potential to expand significantly given the right tools 
and skills. The GSPs currently possess a talented blend of the Ground Intelligence 
Officers, Infantry Unit Leaders, and Rifleman MOS fields with additional Field Radio 
Operator and Intelligence Specialist structure in some select areas, which is supportive of 
modern day operations. However, the quantities and ranks need adjusting to meet the 
demanding goals of EF 21 intelligence collections. The GSPs structure and personnel 
will gain credibility from a merger with the reconnaissance MOS field. UGS, regardless 
of their respective form of intelligence, are ground surveillance assets, which requires 
surveillance specialists, which, as displayed in Chapter III with the training and readiness 
task analysis, is why the reconnaissance MOS exist. Additionally, the SPIE capability 
would serve as a force multiplier for the UGS community, where it too falls within the 
skill set of the reconnaissance community. The changing roles of UGS-related personnel 
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in the USMC required by EF 21 demands focus on the key system element areas of 
operator and maintenance personnel [27]. The key SE design requirements for personnel 
changes related to the USMC’s use of UGS to support EF 21 would be best oriented in 
the area of design for supportability (serviceability) [27]. 
The operator personnel are currently adequate for today’s needs to support MEU, 
MAGTF and other operations as tasked. To meet the expanded needs of EF 21, the GSP 
(EF 21) table of organization reflects additions of reconnaissance and intelligence 
Marines to advance the roles of the operator personnel in the GSPs. As previously 
discussed in this chapter, the reconnaissance Marines will bring highly valuable ground 
reconnaissance and SPIE capabilities to the GSPs, the Intelligence Specialists would 
bolster the unit’s intelligence analysis and collections capability. The emerging current 
COIN, counter terrorism, security, and stability operations reflect the growth of a crafty, 
innovative, adaptive, complex enemy with varying force projection. To the GSPs, this 
means ground maneuver and intelligence collections assets need subject matter experts 
with respect to the enemy in addition to intelligence collections assets in support of UGS 
employment missions. The addition of the Intelligence Specialists to the platoon HQ Tm 
and SETs will foster a better understanding of the battlespace, better fusion of UGS with 
the overall intelligence collections plan, and more accurate pattern analysis of UGS 
activations.   
The maintenance personnel are well structured and equipped to handle the needs 
of EF 21 with the addition of the technicians to the GSPs as per the GSP (EF 21) table of 
organization. TRSS technicians at the SETs could allow for a second echelon 
maintenance capability at the lowest level possible, as well as the addition of a Marine to 
the team that is skilled in radio operations, radio maintenance, who can also receive 
training to become a TRSS monitoring specialist.  
The GSPs must be capable of supporting the needs of EF 21, to do so the SETs 
need skill sets of the reconnaissance, infantry, intelligence, communications MOS fields 
as well as the TRSS Technicians, MOS 2848. The numbers and ranks are debatable, but 
to meet the demands of the Surveillance Sensor Operators for EF 21 all these skill sets 
must be present, which means advanced training and secondary roles for all the team 
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members. Availability in the context of personnel for the GSPs means its billets must 
receive staffing from qualified individuals. Currently, the GSPs lose some HQ Tm 
members and SES level members either as trade space for other MOSs elsewhere in the 
intelligence battalion’s or the billets do not get staffed due to shortages. The GSP table of 
organization may need work to fit the needs of EF 21, but regardless of the organizational 
issues, the qualified personnel must exist to be ready to support the needs of the MEFs 
and MAGTFs.  
H. FACILITIES 
The Intelligence Battalions currently possess great work sites and are on bases 
with multiple training sites, maintenance sites, equipment storage sites, vehicle storage 
sites, and armories. These sites will need modifications to meet the demands placed on 
the GSPs from EF 21, such as storage and maintenance areas for with new 
technologically advanced UGS with their components, as well as SPIE related 
equipment. SPIE related facilities consist of storage sites for combatant dive, parachute, 
small boat, and HRST specific equipment. Passionate Marines enjoy the challenge of 
finding unique and challenging training sites, and this challenge will remain as the role of 
GSP changes for EF 21 with the additional requirement for modifications for longer 
range patrolling to employ the UGS and SPIE missions. System element areas of concern 
for GSP’s facilities may require modifications for the operational real estate, which 
consists of the command post, equipment storage sites, vehicle storage sites, armories, 
and training sites [27]. The main SE design requirements of supportability (serviceability) 
need addressing to upgrade the UGS-related facilities for EF 21 [27]. 
The sites must support the mission, storage, training, simulators, planning spaces, 
and work spaces. In theory this is not difficult, but in execution it requires time, 
resources, and funding for upgrades. Due to their high-risk nature and associated high 
quantities of equipment, current GSP facilities may be unfit to support SPIE operations. 
This and any other added capability would be tethered to facilities upgrades, which if 
done correctly and safely will require significant time and funding. The result is a 
working area that is functional, safe, serves the mission, and protects the equipment while 
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having access to needed training sites, off host station if needed, to prepare the GSPs for 
the employment of UGS at any time and in any place.    
I. CONCLUSION  
Utilizing the SE design process for UGS in the USMC to support EF 21 creates a 
model for accurate solutions to support the true needs of the warfighter. Focusing on the 
sections of SE design elements and requirements for analysis and applying them to each 
area of the DOTMLPF lays a well-structured foundation to cover all facets of the issue. 
Updating the doctrine for commonality and relevance will create products with greater 
utility for those tasked to employ UGS. Using the GSP (EF 21) provides the new 
organizational structure needed to better support the USMC’s needs with UGS through 
the employment of the GSP or its SETs to support the MAGTFs. The training requires 
upgrades to support the organizational changes and demands of EF 21, allowing for the 
testing and integration of the GSPs to support advance intelligence collections missions, 
example as displayed in Chapter I, Figure 3. TRSS needs revamping to become a system 
comparable to that of McQ or ADAPT, to provide the GSPs the level of flexibility and 
maintainability they deserve. Adding the reconnaissance MOS field to the GSPs while 
increasing the intelligence and technician roles creates the structural personnel balance 
the units need to conduct surveillance missions for EF 21. The facilities upgrades come 
tethered to the capabilities and technologies upgrades, requiring increased access to 
training areas, storage for UGS, SPIE, and field equipment, and a command post for 
planning. These changes will produce a sound GSP, skilled with the most advance UGS, 
capable of integrating with numerous intelligence collections assets to support any 
MAGTF for EF 21 missions.   
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The research described by this thesis regarding the employment UGS in the 
USMC reviews the most accurate and current literature, unit and individual Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) information, and technological data to support a systems 
engineering analysis. Defining EF 21 at the forefront served as the lens through which to 
view the research. Chapter I contained the information on relative DOD Joint doctrine, 
with topics from both intelligence and maneuver fields to set some of the overarching 
conditions for the thesis. Following this and the definition of EF 21 are three critical 
vignettes for the use of ground reconnaissance forces and UGS (Figures 1–3, Table 1) to 
visually display key employment concepts. Based on the research conducted for this 
thesis, final recommendations include the synchronization of UGS related doctrine for the 
USMC, new UGS technology similar to that of McQ Incorporated, and a new Ground 
Sensor Platoon (GSP) table of organization bolstering the roles of the Sensor 
Employment Teams (SETs) and fusion with reconnaissance Marines for advance UGS 
employment capabilities. This chapter established boundaries and conditions for the 
remainder of the thesis.   
          The literature review and analysis from Chapter II covered the key issues for the 
history, doctrine, and new concepts associated with the employment of UGS. The history 
of UGS provides insight as to the origination and recent use of UGS for the USMC; from 
the jungle perimeter security and reconnaissance missions of Vietnam to the counter 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) missions of OIF and OEF, UGS were able to shape 
and assist the USMC’s intelligence collections capabilities. The Remote Ground Sensors, 
MAGTF Intelligence Collections, and Ground Reconnaissance publications provided the 
doctrinal background needed to establish analysis on present use of UGS in the USMC. 
The EF 21 Capstone and MCISR-E Roadmap provided significant concepts as to needed 
future use of UGS. Closing this chapter was a review of the thesis, Mobile Situational 
Awareness Tool: Unattended Ground Sensor Based Remote Surveillance System, which 
contains very useful data on how the Defense Advanced 
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Research Products Agency (DARPA) technology can support the USMC’s needs for 
UGS employment. The literature reviewed provided sound justification for areas of 
modification and implementation to foster advancements in UGS employment to support 
EF 21. 
       Chapter III explores the research conducted on the USMC’s reconnaissance 
battalions and intelligence battalions, training, and technology associated with UGS. 
Clear definition of the UGS related roles for the intelligence battalions and 
reconnaissance battalions support table of organization modifications for new EF 21 
intelligence collections requirements. A detailed breakdown of the Surveillance Sensor 
Operator and Reconnaissance Man MOS occurs in this chapter to account for training 
requirements, individual capabilities, and UGS related tasks for the present USMC. 
Comparison and analysis of these unit and MOS facts show common practices between 
them and differences that may support EF 21 or demand changes to do so. Presentation of 
the technology associated with UGS design and capabilities detailed the existing 
government off the shelf system, TRSS; the commercial off the shelf system, the McQ 
Inc. UGS; as well as the DARPA Adaptive Sensor System (ADAPT) prototype system. 
With TRSS being the current USMC system, it shows reliability and an established 
relationship but has significant capabilities gaps when compared to the other two systems 
reviewed. McQ has several advanced UGS with significantly unique capabilities used by 
several DOD elements but is a commercial company and would require screening or 
processing through the lengthy DOD acquisitions programs. DARPA ADAPT presents a 
unique type of UGS that is specific yet flexible and dynamic in that it offers insight into a 
new employment direction with multiple networked nodes. However, this system alone 
would require augments for a long range imaging capability and other features only 
offered by McQ, let alone the completion of its development and establishment of a 
production capability. Comparisons of these equipment types, as displayed in Table 8, 
fosters an EF 21-based analysis that provides justification for the reorganization and 
shaping of UGS management and operations to gain and maintain the most relevant 
technological capabilities for rapid deployment by the USMC. 
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The SE analysis of UGS in the USMC for EF 21 presents a sophisticated method 
to develop a solution to the need for advancements in this field. Using Blanchard’s 
Systems Engineering Management for the analytical foundation and the Doctrine, 
Organizations, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
grouping as a guide, implementation of Figure 34 as a new table of organization aids in 
satisfying the USMC’s needs. This solution called for a restructuring of the GSP to delete 
the Sensor Employment Squad (SES) and reduce the SETs, while increasing the size of 
the SETs and diversifying the MOS structure in the platoon. The addition of SSgt 
reconnaissance Marines to the platoon creates a new leadership and training role to 
advance the field skills and Special Insert / Extract (SPIE) capability of the platoon, while 
enabling longer, higher risk, and more advanced missions. The increased roles of 
Intelligence Specialists and UGS Technicians allows for greater combat support to the 
SET level, as seen fit by the Platoon Leader. The modified rank and structure of the 
Headquarters Team (HQ Tm) allows for advanced leadership for employment and 
networking, as well as more robust and creative training to support EF 21 missions for 
MAGTFs. Using McQ and DARPA ADAPT as technological models, recommended 
advancements to the UGS equipment for the USMC will greatly increase the potential of 
UGS to complete EF 21 tasks. These solutions set the stage for a reshaping of USMC 
structure and equipment to increase readiness, flexibility, adaptability, maintainability, 
and utility.   
B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS 
The first area of recommended future research is to conduct field-testing of the 
limits of the technological capabilities of the different UGS. This thesis research is on 
data collected for the prescribed published capabilities of each of the different sensors. 
Due to time limitations and availability of equipment, no actual field-testing took place to 
see which UGS worked best under certain conditions. To mitigate this, reviewing 
extensive field data from previous tests aided in the analytical efforts, however these data 
sets were not specific to this research. Benefits this research would bring to exhibit the 
capabilities of the equipment in a field performance evaluation, in addition to the factual 
research conducted by this thesis, would add additional accuracy to the final assessments.   
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UGS integration with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) testing would provide 
extensive insight into a related area that is of high interest. UAS such as Predators, 
Shadows, and Scan Eagles have been essential elements of the USMC intelligence 
collections plans for the past ten years. Finding ways to integrate them, with UGS as the 
cueing asset, have been rare and challenging. Research into defining this integration to 
optimize the use of UAS would greatly benefit the DOD due to the high demand, 
workload, and stress of existing UAS. This thesis focused more analysis on the ground 
aspect, which has great utility in an area that may deny the U.S. military use of its air 
space. However, as UAS research and development continues to grow, with small quad 
rotors and man-portable UAS so grows the utility and flexibility of the assets. Research 
into the integration of UAS with UGS has great potential to advance MASINT and 
IMINT collections integrations methods and maximize the use of scarce assets.   
An air delivery (AD) capability for UGS has been a unique and well sought after 
feature since the Vietnam War. It is a capability that has seen some success, however the 
UGS were always difficult to aim, required aircraft to fly missions of increased risk or 
abnormal flight patterns, and often required several UGS for one mission due to damages 
on insert. With modern technological advancements and the risk to personnel for 
emplacement of UGS, AD UGS are becoming more intriguing. The USMC experimented 
with very large AD UGS in 2006; however, the program never materialized. McQ and 
ADAPT both had an AD capability that could be tested, for this is a capability in which 
the USMC still has interest and for which it desires assets. An advanced, usable AD 
UGSs capability for the USMC would allow for employment opportunities that provided 
zero risk to Marines on the ground, which would be an amazing and highly desired 
outcome. Additionally, a similar research study could be conducted for the employment 
of UGS with artillery assets, related to the family of scatter-able mines for conventional 
munitions. Research in this field, combined with this thesis, would advance the USMC’s 
UGS in a new direction with an added capability.   
Field-testing for the employment of UGS with reconnaissance Marines and 
Surveillance Sensor Operators should establish a baseline for support to UGS 
employment for EF 21 intelligence collections operations. As discussed in Chapter II, the 
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reconnaissance battalions have many more training events and Mission Essential Tasks 
(METs) than the GSPs, all focused on advanced tactical missions. However, the GSPs 
tasks are focused, direct, technical, and oriented on the employment of UGS. Given a 
scenario, testing the two fields on ground tactics, the reconnaissance Marines vs the GSP 
Marines, would generate great insight as to who is best to work with UGS under EF 21 
conditions. Forming a combination of the two fields, as shown in Figure 34, has great 
potential for the UGS community; however, testing for confirmation and research could 
validate this approach. 
With the U.S. Army and the USMC possessing similar ground intelligence 
collections capabilities yet vastly different structures, analysis done to compare these 
factors would generate interesting research. With the U.S. Army revamping their UGS 
program, such research provides great potential for a fielding plan and maintenance 
structure, one that could be unique and different from that of the USMC with TRSS. In 
addition, the U.S. Army recently reorganized their reconnaissance and intelligence units 
to form Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (BFSBs) [28]. These BFSBs contain many 
different specialties, such as UGS, a ground reconnaissance squadron, and UGS platoon 
in a military intelligence battalion [28]. All of these assets rest under one brigade 
command oriented on focused ground intelligence collections to support answering the 
intelligence requirements of a division, corps, or Joint Task Force [28]. Research into this 
area would show if this structure could enhance the USMC’s ability to provide ground 
reconnaissance and intelligence support, and possibly create better UGS employment 
methods.     
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